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PREFACE 
1 .- 
This study was  supported by NASA Headquarters and managed by the 
Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight. 
Schaefer was the study monitor. Supported by Mr. Charles W. Childs of the 
NASA Safety Office, he provided guidance and counsel that significantly aided 
this effort. 
Mr. Herbert 
The results of the study a r e  presented in three volumes: Management 
Summary Report (Volume I), Technical Discussion (Volume 11) , and 
Appendices (Volume 111). 
The Management Summary Report (Volume I) presents a brief, concise 
review of the study content, and summarizes the principal conclusions and 
recommendations. 
condensed, easily assimilated overview for management. 
The purpose of the Summary Report i s  to provide a 
The Technical Discussion (Volume 11) i s  the principal volume in the series.  
It provides a comprehensive discussion of the problems of assuring crew 
and passenger safety in the post-Skylab Integrated Program. 
procedures and the use of "standard" and specially-designed equipment a r e  
treated. 
Operational 
Much of the material  presented in Volume I1 was derived through detailed 
analyses. 
Volume 111, Appendices. 
to specialists in the a reas  discussed. 
These analyses and other backup material a r e  presented in 
The contents of Volume 1x1 a r e  of interest primarily 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
2 
i .  1 BACKGROUND 
The need and feasibility of aiding distressed space crews have been of 
concern since the initiation of the manned United States space program. 
Many proposals have been made and numerous suggestions have been 
offered on concepts to reduce the hazards of space flight. 
and remedial techniques have been considered. 
bility initially limited spacecraft to essential mission equipment, safety 
depended on the reliability and redundancy of mission equipment and the 
selection of preferred mission operational modes. Special provisions o r  
equipment for crew rescue o r  escape, except in the case of launch abort, 
have not been provided. 
Both preventive 
Since launch vehicle capa- 
The missions being considered under the Integrated Program are vastly 
more complex and of much longer duration than any previously flown. 
vehicles and passengers not trained as test  pilots will be involved. 
hardware designs and operating concepts a r e  being introduced, and a large 
increase in flight frequency is anticipated. 
viously accepted space flight safety considerations are clearly appropriate. 
Many 
New 
A review and updating of pre- 
The Aerospace Corporation has been actively involved in the problem of 
manned space flight safety and because of this experience was selected to 
perform this study. 
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the study were: 
a. Assess the gross hazards to crew and passengers of the 
post-Skylab missions proposed under the Integrated 
Program. 
-1- 
1.3 
b. Evaluate possible escape or  rescue operations and devices 
for assuring crew and passenger survival. 
Provide a technical perspective from which desirable 
safety-oriented actions can be identified. 
C. 
STUDY SCOPE 
All manned phases of the Integrated Program were considered. 
were low earth orbit missions, geosynchronous missions, lunar orbit and 
landing missions, and possible planetary missions. Although both mission 
and hardware definitions a r e  still in the preliminary phase, the currently 
available information was used wherever possible. 
Included 
Flight phases occurring within the earth's atmosphere were excluded from 
consideration. 
occurrence of the identified emergencies. 
Also, no assessment was made of the relative probability of 
1.4 STUDY PLAN 
1.4. I Definitions 
The following definitions were adopted: 
I. 4.2 
Emergency - An emergency is that situation resulting 
from the occurrence of a hazard which threatens the life 
o r  well-being of crew o r  passengers and which requires 
action to be taken to resolve o r  alleviate the situation. 
Remedial Svstem - A remedial system is a system 
capable of r e  solving the emergency situation by providing 
crew and passengers with a safe haven and includes the 
techniques of escape and rescue. 
Approach 
The principal steps in performing the study were: 
a. Review available NASA mission and hardware element 
b. 
planning for each mission regime 
Identify the hazards which lead to emergency situations 
requiring remedial action 
As se s s available contingency planning c. 
-2- 
‘i 
. I  
1.4.3 
d. Examine selected operational factors introduced by the 
Integrated Program 
Determine the operational and equipment requirements 
of a Space Rescue Vehicle 
Identify and compare the relative effectiveness of feasible 
remedial concepts for dealing with the identified emergency 
situations 
e. 
f. 
Evaluation Criteria 
A number of cri teria were considered in evaluating the potential utility and 
attractiveness for implementation of the various remedial concepts examined. 
They included: 
a. The degree o r  extent of aid rendered by the remedial 
concept. In this regard, a number of potential needs were 
addressed: 
(I) habitable shelter 
(2) life support 
(3)  communications function 
(4) medical aid 
(5) crew transfer capability 
( 6 )  crew retrieval capability 
(7) completeness of the remedial action; i. e . ,  whether 
the action is an intermediate one which merely 
alleviates the emergency o r  is a final action totally 
resolving the emergency. 
b. Reaction Time - Both the speed of response to the emergency 
and the speed of return to a safe haven were considered. 
The extent of required participation by the crew o r  
passengers of the distressed vehicle in the remedial 
operations. 
regard, hardware was given preference i f  either planned 
o r  projected for the Integrated Program. 
The state of the a r t  of the remedial system. 
c. 
d. The development status of the remedial system. In this 
e .  
- 3 -  
f. The feasibility of multiple -use. Remedial systems having 
application to more than one Integrated Program mission 
were given preference. 
g. Practicality of use. 
h. Extent of nominal mission payload reduction. 
1.4.4 Resources /Data Base 
The study was intended to build on and update the results of previous studies 
relevant to the issue of Integrated Program space flight safety. 
a large number of NASA and contractor technical reports, documents, 
briefings, etc. , were reviewed in the course of the study. 
those specific reports actually utilized o r  relied upon a r e  given throughout 
this report in the pertinent section to which they apply. 
Therefore, 
References to 
- 4- 
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2. 1 
2. MISSION MODEL AND HARDWARE DEFINITION 
GENERAL 
The NASA Integrated Program is based upon the multi-purpose use of basic 
hardware elements. These include: 
a. A reusable Earth Orbit Shuttle, consisting of a Booster 
and an Orbiter, for crew rotation and passenger and cargo 
delivery into low earth orbit, and for experiment delivery. 
In fact, early flights a r e  expected to involve experimenta- 
tion aboard the Orbiter. 
Space Station Modules with application a s  b. 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) Orbiting lunar station 
(5) Lunar surface base 
(6) Mars exploration spacecraft 
Low earth orbit space station 
Synchronous earth orbit space station 
Low earth orbit space base 
c. A Tug for  cargo transfer in 
(I) Earth orbit 
(2) Lunar orbit 
(3)  Between lunar orbit and lunar surface 
d. A Space Shuttle, either chemical o r  nuclear powered, for 
cargo transfer between low earth orbit and 
(I) Geosynchronous orbit 
(2) Lunar orbit 
e. An Orbiting Propellant Depot for use in  
(1) Earth orbit 
(2) Lunar orbit 
- 5 -  
2.2 SUMMARY O F  INTEGRATED PROGRAM PLAN 
The foregoing Integrated Program missions and hardware elements are 
summarized pictorially in  Figure i. 
(Int-2i) and various unmanned planetary probes which were not part  of the 
present study. 
and hardware details is presented in Appendix A. 
Also shown is the unmanned Saturn V 
A more complete discussion of Integrated Program mission 
> g 
. . . . ..s' ... 
- 6 -  
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2 
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3.  HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
3. I GENERAL 
An extensive review was made of the hazard studies conducted by many 
investigators. 
elements o r  single missions, and numerous terms were employed to 
describe space flight hazards. 
factors, similar hazards (summarized in Figure 2) have generally been 
identified by the different investigators. 
hazards may also be anticipated for the Integrated Program missions and 
hardware. 
tems, similar space environments, and similar human limitations a r e  
involved. 
3.2 EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
Identification of hazards is a necessary step in defining emergencies. 
ever, it is the emergency situations themselves which space rescue opera- 
tions must consider. 
distinction between hazards and emergency situations. 
emergency situations resulting from the identified hazards applicable to the 
Integrated Program missions and hardware is given in Figure 3. 
These studies were frequently restricted to single hardware 
Nevertheless, when reduced to causative 
Analysis revealed that these same 
This conclusion is not unexpected inasmuch a s  similar subsys- 
How- 
Hazards analyses have usually neglected to make a 
A summary of the 
Each item listed does not necessarily apply to a l l  program elements. For 
example, a radiation source must be aboard a disabled spacecraft to cause 
radiation in  its vicinity following an accident. 
from space i s  an Orbiter problem only, since it is the only hardware element 
with planned reentry capability. Therefore, applicable remedial solutions 
need be provided only for the specific Integrated Program hardware and 
activity which produce the emergency being resolved. 
Also, inability to reenter 
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3 . 3  SUMMARY 
In general, however, it can be seen from the foregoing analyses that any 
vehicle called upon to provide rescue capability should be able to provide: 
a. a habitable haven for the rescued crew 
b. medical aid (facilities and service) for ill o r  injured 
personnel 
life support for extending crew survival 
communication with the distressed crew during the rescue 
operation 
emergency power during the rescue operation 
transportation from the scene of the emergency to a final 
haven of safety 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
It can also be seen that a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) coming to the aid of a 
distressed vehicle (DV) may need the following capability: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
collision avoidance with debris generated by the DV 
radiation protection from DV sources 
ability to dock with a disabled vehicle 
ability to a r r e s t  the motion of a tumbling vehicle 
ability to retrieve personnel from EVA and from a DV 
where docking is not possible 
A more detailed discussion of the hazards analyses and emergency identifi- 
cation analyses is presented in Appendix B. 
-12- 
4. CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
4. i BACKGROUND 
There is, as yet, no separately documented, overall safety plan for the 
manned phases of the Integrated Program. However, an extensive examina- 
tion of a l l  available NASA and contractor documents was made and revealed 
numerous references and guidelines for crew and passenger safety. Although 
specific references may not be found for each mission and hardware element, 
a "de facto" plan clearly exists. 
contingency when it happens. 
Its intent is to be able to deal with any 
4.2 GENERAL PLANNING 
NASA and industry references recognize that in spite of all precautions, 
emergencies can and will occur. 
considered. 
orbit and lunar missions, 
Shuttle (EOS), Tug, and Space Shuttles to be available for this purpose. For 
the Mars Mission emergencies, self-help appears to be the only solution. 
Buddy system concepts a re  being proposed for this latter mission, including 
redundant spacecraft, mission modules, and landers. 
Both self-help and rescue possibilities a r e  
It is proposed that rescue capability be provided for both earth 
Missions will be designed to allow Earth Orbit 
A detailed discussion and summarization of the specific remedial and pre- 
ventive plans proposed to date for the Integrated Program a r e  presented in 
Appendix C. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
Current plans a r e  as yet incomplete and must remain dynamic, changing as 
the missions and hardware elements become more clearly defined. It is to 
be noted that a t  the present time, certain equipment capabilities and opera- 
tions a r e  assumed without considering their technical feasibility. 
assumed is the availability, when needed, of specialized escape and 
Also 
- 13- 
rescue equipment. Furthermore, there is little coordinated planning between 
interfacing major hardware elements. 
There a re ,  a s  yet, no escape o r  rescue provisions specified for either the 
Earth Orbit Shuttle o r  the manned Tug (nor for the Space Shuttle). 
.... 
- 14- 
5. RESCUE VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 GENERAL 
Most studies treating rescue vehicles have, in the main, been concerned with 
gross configurational definition and with the performance and operational 
considerations of launching and providing a rescue vehicle at the scene of 
the emergency. Little, if any, attention has been directed toward determining 
the specific operational steps to be taken upon arrival in the vicinity of a 
distressed vehicle, and what special capability o r  equipment a rescue vehicle 
might need. It has been generally assumed that once a "rescue vehicle" has 
arrived on the scene, it could accomplish its intended objective. 
The purpose of this phase of the study was to examine the period commencing 
with the arr ival  of a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) in the vicinity of a dis- 
tressed vehicle (DV) and ending with the departure of the SRV to a final haven 
of safety. 
steps and attendant equipment requirements involved in the space rescue 
operation for potential Integrated Program emergencies can be provided. 
Thus, a c learer  understanding and assessment of the operational 
5.2 METHOD OF APPROACH 
Figure 4 illustrates the specific approach followed in performing this phase 
of the study. 
Logic diagrams were prepared which described the g ross  operational alterna- 
tives facing an SRV when it arrives in the vicinity of a DV. 
emergency situations considered were those previously identified in Figure 3.  
From these operational alternatives, non- routine space operations were 
further examined via logic diagrams to define those operational methods and 
equipment characteristics which were unique to space rescue operations. 
Based on this definition of requirements, a variety of special equipment 
concepts and operational procedures (including timelines) were delineated. 
The specific 
-15 -  
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As an example, Figure 5 represents the top flow diagram of rescue operations 
in the general case. ~n SRV arriving in the vicinity of a DV (point @ 
may be faced with the need for  data acquisition. 
presence o r  absence of DV-generated debris o r  radiation needs be verified 
before the SRV can safely proceed to close rendezvous with the DV. 
DV may lie mute and unable to communicate with the SRV, requiring the SRV 
to perform surveys and inspections of the general area as well as of the DV 
before proceeding further. 
Fo r  its own safety, the 
The 
As a next operation, it may be necessary to de-spin the DV prior to proceed- 
ing with the rescue mission. 
The DV crew could be within the DV o r  have bailed out with a Bail-Out-Device 
(BOD). If within the DV, the rescue crew (RC) may be required to board the 
DV (via docking o r  EVA) to perform operations within the D V  (damage control, 
medical aid, repair, etc.)  and transfer the DV crew to the SRV. The rescue 
is completed by returning the DV crew to a permanent haven. 
If the DV crew is in a BOD, the primary operational task is to transfer the DV 
crew to the SRV. 
In addition to the above operations, it may be necessary for the RC to either 
dispose of o r  secure the DV by shutting down various equipments (nuclear 
reactors, etc.) ,  adjusting the orbit of the DV for later disposal, o r  initiating 
a controlled reentry of the DV for system disposal purposes. 
From these gross operational alternatives, further detailed logic diagrams 
were prepared for  each alternative approach to the level necessary for the 
definition of specific methods and equipment characteristics. 
plete discussion of these logic diagrams and the resultant operational methods 
and equipment details is presented in Appendix H. 
A more com- 
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5.3 SELECTED STUDY AREAS 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As might be expected, detailed examination of the rescue alternatives to the 
wide range of emergency situations identified in Figure 3 resulted in the 
defini€ion of a similarly large number of potential rescue vehicle operational 
procedures and special equipment requirements. 
associated with (1) hazards to the SRV, (2) crew transfer difficulties, and 
(3) rescue delays are discussed in this section. 
treatment of these a reas  and discussion of other potential SRV operational 
and equipment requirements a r e  presented in Appendices F, G, H, and I. 
Those requirements 
A more comprehensive 
5.3.2 
5.3.2.1 Debris Generated by DV 
Hazards to the Space Rescue Vehicle 
The possibility of an explosion on board the DV as the hazard which caused 
the emergency led to the conclusion (in Section 3) that some of the DV- 
generated debris could be in the vicinity of the D V  when the SRV later 
approached the DV to render aid. If so, such debris could definitely consti- 
tute a hazard to the SRV itself. 
In order to siibstantiate this possibility, a simplified first-order analysis of 
the resultant trajectory and motion characteristics of debris ejected from an 
orbiting vehicle was performed (see Appendix I- 1). 
indicated that (1) debris ejected radially from the D V  returns to the source 
(DV) once each D V  orbit, (2) debris ejected tangentially never returns to 
the source, and (3) debris ejected 90" to the orbit plane returns to the source 
twice each DV orbit. Figure 6 surnrnarizes these results. 
The analysis results 
Thus, collision between an arriving SRV and DV-generated debris is a definite 
possibility, and the ability to detect and avoid such debris is a desirable SRV 
capability. A brief assessment of detection equipment (Appendix H) indicates 
that long wave infrared (LWIR) and l a se r  radar systems have potential for 
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, .” 
. 
providing this capability at  reasonable weight, volume, and power requirements. 
Further, these laser  radar systems may be applicable to the rendezvous and 
docking function as well. 
5.3.2.2 Uncontrolled Radiation 
Another potential hazard to an arriving SRV is uncontrolled radiation. Nuclear 
reactors have been proposed a s  power system sources for the space station/ 
base. Nuclear isotope sources have also been considered for certain experi- 
ments, as  well as for power-generation systems. 
rocket engine is the propulsive source of the reusable Nuclear Space Shuttle. 
Malfunctions of either reactor o r  isotope sources in  a DV could result in 
uncontrolled radiation of the neutron, alpha, beta, gamma, and x-ray types. 
The general requirement exists, therefore, for an SRV to have sensory 
systems able to perform radiation detection and diagnostic functions. 
able capability would include (1) determining a safe approach corridor to a 
DV and (2) determining the nature and source of the particular nuclear mal- 
function and its probable effect on the DV, SRV, and rescue crew during 
rescue operations. 
In addition, a nuclear 
Desir- 
A variety of nuclear detection equipment which has potential application to 
this problem area already exists. F o r  detection surveys upon arr ival  of the 
SRV at the scene (distances up to 10 n mi), neutron detectors (proportional 
counter), alpha detectors (proportional counter), and gamma and x-ray 
detection (collimated scintillation counter) may be applicable. 
detection surveys of o r  within the DV, portable versions of proportional 
counters o r  Geiger counters (for g a m a ,  x-ray, and beta radiation) may 
be appropriate. 
For  closer 
(See Appendix H for details). 
5.3.3 Crew Transfer Difficulties 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the general requirement of crew transfer occurs 
frequently in a rescue mission. If the DV is stabilized (no undesirable vehicle 
-21- 
motion) and if  the standard docking provisions of the DV are operative, the 
transfer of crew between the DV and SRV could be accomplished via a routine 
docking and transfer operation. 
On the other hand, i f  the DV has motion sufficient to preclude the docking 
maneuver, o r  if t h e ' D V  docking mechanisms are damaged o r  inoperative, 
it may be necessary to perform the transfer by EVA. 
In some cases, such as a crewman injured to the extent that he cannot be 
placed in a suit for EVA transfer, special equipment may be necessary to 
either effect an EVA transfer o r  to enable an otherwise infeasible docking 
transfer. A summary of the study results pertaining to these transfer 
problems is presented in  the following three sections. 
discussion of the crew transfer problem is presented in  Appendix H. 
A comprehensive 
5.3.3.1 Undesirable Vehicle Motion 
The potential hazards of explosion, vehicle collisions, and reaction control 
system malfunctions could result in spinning o r  tumbling of a DV. Prelim- 
inary estimates (Appendix 1-2) indicate that large spacecraft, e. g., a space 
station, could have residual spin rates up to 4 rpm. 
is unlikely. 
was still functioning o r  after the elapse of a long time. 
P r io r  to any attempted physical contact between the SRV and DV, it would 
first be necessary to characterize the DV motion. 
axis of rotation and nutation (wobble) rate and angle would have to be known. 
One possible method for such DV motion characterization requires at least 
three retro-reflectors suitably positioned beforehand on the outer shell of 
the DV (at a weight penalty of 2 lb) and a scanning laser radar and computer 
system on board the SRV (at a weight of approximately 30 lb  and a volume of 
approximately 2 f t  ). Such a system would have an effective range of approxi- 
mately 1 mile. 
P u r e  spin, however, 
It would probably exist only i f  the DV attitude control system 
The DV spin rate and 
3 
-22- 
If an SR.V attempted to dock with a spinning DV in the plane of spin, an SRV 
thrust-to-weight ratio of approximately 0.5 would be required because of 
centrifugal force effects. 
(EOS, Space Tug), because they do not have thrusts of this magnitude. 
This is not feasible for Integrated Program vehicles 
If, for  docking purposes, an SRV approached a spinning DV along the spin 
axis, the centrifugal force problem is avoided. However, the SRV and D V  
docking ports must both be on the axis of spin, and even then the docking 
torques would be greater than normal. 
the spin axis is unlikely except in the case of an intentionally rotating space 
system. 
Further, a docking port located in  
If the DV motion was not pure spin (i. e., contained "wobble"), a complex 
SRV control problem occurs in attempting to match the wobble pattern of the 
DV. 
questionable unless the motion of the DV can be reduced to an acceptable 
level. 
Therefore, the feasibility of approach along the spin axis is also 
Means €or reducing undesirable DV motion to acceptable limits for docking 
o r  EVA transfer involve, of course, either the activation of some momentum 
transfer device on the D V  itself o r  a built-in tumbling-arrester system in 
the SRV. 
capability, but no known practical schemes have been evolved to date for 
vehicles of the size envisioned for  the Integrated Program. Examples of the 
former approach include a mass  on a cable (yo-yo) o r  a rocket system, either 
appropriately emplaced beforehand on the DV o r  attached by an SRV crew at  
the scene of the emergency (in EVA o r  manipulator-assisted operations). 
The latter approach has often been mentioned a s  a desirable SRV 
For  the case of a 120,000-lb space station with motion at  4 rpm about its 
major axis of rotation, a yo-yo system consisting of 1200 feet of cable and 
a 100-lb weight would be adequate (total weight about 150 lb, total stowage 
volume about 3 f t  ). Alternatively, a rocket thrust system with approximately 3 
-23- 
70 lb  thrust and burning approximately 30 minutes could also reduce the DV 
motion (total weight about 460 lb, total stowage volume approximately 7 f t  ). 3 
5 . 3 . 3 . 2  Inability to Dock 
If the SRV is unable to dock with the DV, the transfer of the DV personnel 
and/or RC would have to take place by means of EVA. 
suits with their 3 . 5  psia pure oxygen atmosphere a r e  not very well suited 
for such emergency transfers because of the required period (about 4 hours) 
of acclimatization to the 14.7 psia atmospheres for  the SRV and the DV to 
avoid decompression sickness. 
a new suit with an Nz/Oz atmosphere at  a pressure of 7 psia o r  more, which 
would not require acclimatization time. 
Present-day EVA space 
This points to the need for development of 
Fo r  the EVA transfer between the two vehicles, and also for  providing a 
stabilized maneuverable platform with a variety of effort-saving devices 
(tools, manipulator a rms ,  lights, etc. ), platform-type astronaut maneuvering 
units (AMU’s) (see Figure 7 )  may be highly desirable during certain EVA 
space res  cue ope rations. 
A manipulator unit (also shown in Figure 7), providing a shirtsleeve environ- 
ment for the RC, is a logical extension of the platform-type AMU. 
requires all  dextrous motions to be performed through manipulator a rms .  
3 
This device 
A special transfer capsule is needed for the case of a DV crew member injured 
to the extent that he cannot be placed in a suit for EVA transfer to the SRV. 
A suggested design, Figure 8, consists of an inflatable shell with a docking 
port/hatch assembly at  one end for attachment to a docking port of a DV. 
attached, it can be inflated by a pressurizing atmosphere supply and the 
injured crewrnan placed within on an inflatable personnel car r ie r  (stretcher).  
The hatch is  then closed, the transfer capsule undocked from the DV, and then 
transported (by EVA crewman or AMU) to the SRV, where the injured man 
can be removed in like fashion. 
isolation capsule. 
Once 
This device could also be used as  a quarantine 
- 24- 
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5 . 3 . 3 . 3  
If, for any reason, the EVA transfer mode is either not feasible o r  is not 
desired under the existing conditions, other special transfer equipment could 
prove of value. 
in Figure 9. 
a soft-docking fixture. 
EVA N o t  Feasible o r  N o t  Desired 
Three such concepts, identified in this study, a r e  depicted 
They a r e  a portable airlock, an attachable docking fixture, and 
The f i rs t  device, a portable airlock, consists of an inflatable shell with neuter 
docking/hatch assemblies at. both ends. It is inflatable with a pressurizing 
gas supply, similar to the transfer capsule previously described: It could 
be stored on board a DV or  the SRV. 
The primary purpose of the portable airlock is to provide a means for EVA 
entry and exit in the event that a functioning airlock is not available. However, 
a s  defined herein, the portable airlock can also serve a s  a transfer device. 
With the addition of appropriate life support and stabilization equipment, it 
could also function as a Bail-Out-and-Wait device. Further, suitably equipped, 
it could provide a biological decontamination function. 
Transfer of the portable airlock between the SRV and the DV is by EVA crew- 
men with AMU's ,  by a small reaction control system (RCS) built into the 
airlock, or  by an automated unmanned maneuvering unit. 
The second device, an attachable docking fixture, has application to those 
situations where the DV motion is sufficiently stable to permit docking, but 
the normal docking fixture of the DV is inoperable. 
docking interface at  one end and locking latch/inflatable seal/docking hatch 
configuration on the other end. 
an existing hatch on the DV (e. g., the EVA airlock hatch) to permit a routine 
docking transfer operation to o r  f rom the DV. In this situation, the docking 
fixture locking latch mechanism would be inserted into the DV hatch opening 
and held in  place with an inflatable seal, a s  illustrated. 
plished by an EVA crew o r  by a remotely controlled automatic manipulator unit. 
It is a unit with a neuter 
The intent is to attach the docking fixture to 
Attachment is accom- 
-27- 
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The third device, a soft-docking fixture, has application in those instances 
where the DV is relatively stable but sufficient nutation (wobble) exists to 
prevent conventional hard-docking. If either the D V  or  SRV were equipped 
with a soft-docking fixture, the transfer operations could be performed by 
docking instead of EVA activity. 
5.3.4 Res cue Delays 
Aside from the difficulties involved in  transfer of SRV and DV crews, as 
discussed above, large time delays may be encountered in rescuing the DV 
crew due to (I) damage on board the DV and (2) the need for  immediate 
medical attention to injured crew members (see Appendix H) . 
5.3.4.1 
Damage in the distressed vehicle can cause rescue delays due to (1) loss of 
communications, (2) need for damage assessment by the RC, (3) need for 
damage control by the RC, and (4) emergency entry requirements. 
Damage In The Distressed Vehicle 
5.3.4.1. I Loss of Communications 
The RC have many information needs during a rescue mission. 
the DV has deactivated the.DV communications system, o r  i f  the DV zrew 
a re  unable to perform, the RC may have to take time to acquire necessary 
information with their own communications o r  sensory systems before pro- 
ceeding with the rescue operations. 
If damage to 
Information required by the arriving SRV includes: 
I. Hazards to the SRV (debris, radiation) 
2. Extent of D V  damage 
3. Status of the crew 
4. Location of the crew 
5 .  Proper  method for DV entry and/or D V  crew transfer 
- 2 9 -  
Voice radio and telemetry links, of course, are the preferred techniques for 
communication between the SRV and DV. 
scanning, blinker signals) may be necessary in some situations. External 
readout provisions on the D V  could provide another communication dimension 
for the RC. 
Visual communication (visual 
To provide for communication contingencies, it is appropriate to consider 
implementation of the following types of communications features: 
1. Located on DV 
a. 
b. Handsets in every compartment 
c .  Omnidirectional exterior antenna 
d. Visual blinker system 
e. 
Redundant voice and telemetry transponder/ 
transmitter (with battery power supply) 
Exterior readouts fo r  telephones and damage 
sensors 
5.3.4.1.2 
2.  Located on SRV 
a. Visual blinker system 
b. 
C .  Portable plug-in telephone system 
d. Illuminato r (for visual scanning) 
e. Remotely controlled TV car r ie r  
Portable plug-in damage sensor readout 
Damage Assessment 
Additional equipment may be necessary for determining the extent of the DV 
damage and possible hazards to the SRV and crews. A portable sampling/ 
analysis kit would be especially useful to (1) determine compartment pressures 
and atmospheric composition, (2) test for contaminants, and (3) detect 
radiation. 
radiation detector and would be plugged into exterior sampling ports built-in- 
It would contain a gas analysis kit, a pressure gauge, and a 
+ % '  a 
-30- 
:I 
to the DV. 
after entry. 
a volume of approximately 1.25 f t  for a portable kit  of this type. 
It could also be used for interior compartment surveys of the DV 
Preliminary estimates indicate a total weight of about 40 lb  and 
3 
5.3.4.1.3 Damage Control 
Possible damage control operations required of the RC include (1) fire fighting, 
(2) decontamination, and (3) clearing passageway obstruction. 
The use of fire extinguishers and cabin depressurization a r e  two recognized 
techniques for arresting fires.  
may be necessary for the RC to use a drilling tool to make vent holes, if the 
D V  does not have compartment vent valves in the particular a rea  o r  if those 
vents a r e  inoperable o r  inaccessible. 
In order  to implement depressurization, it 
A decontamination operation may be required because of the presence of toxic 
gases, bacteria, o r  radiation sources. 
vent the toxic gases,  again with the possible need for a cutting or  drilling tool 
Depressurization could be used to 
i to  make a suitable vent. 
bacterial action. 
RC) may be necessary to approach and retrieve the DV crew from radiation- 
contaminated a reas  o r  to acquire and dispose of nuclear radiation sources. 
A cutting o r  drilling tool would be a useful device also for the clearing of 
interior passages. 
exterior to the vehicle, the manned manipulator unit of Figure 7 would be 
applicable. 
type illustrated in Figure 10. 
Chemicals may be required to suppress undesirable 3, 
A device such as a portable radiation shield (carried by the 
In the event such darnage control were to be accomplished 
Also applicable is a remote -controlled manipulator unit of the 
There is also a potential requirement for decontamination of the RC and DV 
crew when reentering the SRV. If such decontamination steps cannot be 
effectively made while on board the DV, it may be necessary to provide 
decontamination facilities in an airlock of the SRV. 
-31- 
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5.3.4.1.4 Emergency Entry 
Regardless of whether transfer of the RC to the DV is accomplished by docking 
o r  by EVA, the RC is faced with the possibility that the DV crew may be 
entrapped within a specific portion of the DV, o r  injured to the extent that 
they cannot participate effectively in operations to permit RC entry through 
DV hatches . 
In either case, it would be advantageous to provide means (I) to facilitate RC 
entry through DV hatches and (2) to enable the RC to enter DV compartments 
without hatches. 
Entry through existing hatches can be augmented o r  facilitated in a number of 
ways. 
e ter  inner hatch could be used for emergency entry in the event the larger-  
diameter hatch became inoperable. 
hatch ejection mechanisms can be considered in the initial hatch design. 
Third, multiple entryways o r  hatches to any given compartment can provide 
alternate entry paths in the event of malfunction o r  damage of the primary 
entry path. 
First, a double hatch design can be employed wherein a smaller-diam- 
Second, explosively-actuated eme rgency 
In those cases where the single entry (hatch, etc.)  to a compartment is blocked 
o r  cannot be actuated, it may be necessary to attempt entry through a wall 
o r  bulkhead. Cutting through a bulkhead with tools is one approach, but it 
may be desirable to provide, in some spacecraft compartments, for a 
penetrable wall a rea  o r  bulkhead design, which should be suitably marked as 
such. 
section of a wall o r  bulkhead to receive a flexible linear shaped charge that 
can be used to explosively cut an opening for emergency entry. 
that this approach would require an added structural weight in the bulkhead of 
about 5 lb  for a 3-ft diameter opening; the charge weight is approximately 
0.05 lb/linear foot. 
One approach is to incorporate built-in receptacles in a designated 
It is estimated 
I 
-33- 
5.3.4.2 
The potential need to provide medical aid to injured DV crew members implies 
that the RC should be trained in  administering such aid and that the necessary 
supplies and provisions must be carried by the SRV. 
medical aid on board the DV before t ransfer  to the SRV further suggests that 
medical supplies be in easily transportable kit form. 
Medical Needs of Injured Crew 
The need to provide 
Table 1 is a listing of various medical kits and their weights which a r e  pertinent 
to  emergency medical aid requirements. A more comprehensive discussion of 
potential injury o r  illness needs and their corresponding medical equipment 
requirements is presented in Appendix G. 
5.4 OTHER OPERATIONAL REQUrriEMENTS 
A number of other operations may be necessary during a rescue mission. 
These include administering emergency life support, making repairs to the 
DV, carrying injured crewmen, and performing fly-around inspections of the 
DV. 
capabilities may also be required of the SRV. 
following paragraphs. 
To meet these additional needs, other specific equipment and performance 1 
These a r e  discussed in the 
5.4.1 Miscellaneous Equipment 
A variety of miscellaneous equipment items were identified in the course of 
this study that were ancillary o r  needed in support of other discrete operational 
steps. 
weight and volume characteristics. 
These a r e  briefly summarized in Table 2 together with estimated 
(See Appendix H for details. ) 
One item deserving special mention is a portable EC/LS unit to be carried 
from the SRV to the DV for  sustenance of the DV crew while the rescue 
operation is in progress.  As shown in Table 3, this unit would have an 
oxygen source, capacity for dehumidification, GO2 removal, cooling, and 
a power supply. The estimated weight for  a 14-man/48-hour capacity is about 
-34- 
Table I. Medical Ki t  Requirements 
K i t  Type 
Drugs and Medication K i t  
Intravenous Fluids K i t  
Dressings, Packings, Bandages K i t  
Suture K i t s  
Incision and Drainage Sets 
Tracheotomy K i t  
Inflatable Splints 
Miscellaneous 
Wt, lb 
2.5 
15.0 
I. 5
1.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
3.0 
- 
-35- 
- 
m 
u 
.rl 
c, 
m 
.rl 
k 
Q) 
c, u 
rd 
k 
2 u 
- 
- 3 6 -  
8 
.r( 
c, 
4 
3 
0 rn 
- 
c, 
3 
E 
$ 
Q) 
k 
3 
.r( 
d 
a 
0 
.r( 
k 
k 
PI 
4 3  
3 
a 
+- 
d 
0 
E: n 
h u 
M 
k 
a, 
3 
E w 
0 0 
N N 
4 
In 
d 
0 
0 
N 
0 
N rn 
a, u 
k 
3 
0 
m 
5 
8 
M 
h 
4 s 
E 
d .! 
0 
O M  
0 0  u u  
k 
a, 
B 
i 
a 
0 .r( 
m 
.r( 
S 
0 
k 
a, 
k 
cd 
14 
3 
-37 - 
3 520 lb at a volume of 12 ft . 
provided for  the same period for approximately 96 lb and 1.5 f t  . 
Emergency provisions (food, water) could be 
3 
As an emergency oxygen source stored aboard the DV, sodium chlorate 
candles could be carried a t  an estimated weight of 200 lb  and volume of 2 f t  
f o r  the same 14-man/48-hour life support period. 
3 
5.4.2 Post -Rendezvous Performance 
After arriving in  the DV vicinity, fhe SRV requires a AV capability of about 
200 fps under nominal conditions in order to perform terminal rendezvous, 
docking, and stationkeeping with the DV. If the SRV had to approach a 
rotating DV along its spin axis to dock, this AV requirement could approach 
600 fps. 
If a fly-around inspection of the DV were necessary pr ior  to rendezvous and 
docking, the AV requirements would depend upon the fly-around technique 
to be used. 
5 to 10 fps in a single impulse burn, with an  entire D V  orbital period required 
for the fly-around. 
about 1900 fps applied over a 10-minute period at a thrust-to-weight ratio of 
0 .1  would be required at a fly-around radius of 5 n mi about the DV. If this 
radius were reduced to 100 f t ,  the AV requirement would be approximately 
350 fps applied over a 30-minute period at  a thrust-to-weight ratio of 0.006. 
If time permitted a slow fly-around, the AV could be a s  low a s  
If a fast fly-around inspection were required, a AV of 
The foregoing results a r e  summarized in Table 4. A more detailed discussion 
of the fly-around inspection problem is presented in Appendix 1-3. 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.5.1 Distressed Vehicle Design ImDact 
. ,.I 
Special design and equipment features must be considered early in the design 
of every spacecraft in order to facilitate rescue operations i f  they should ever 
be needed. 
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In the design area,  the most important consideration is preplanning to facilitate 
entry of an RC into compartments of the DV. 
actuated hatch mechanisms, multiple entryways and hatches, and penetrable 
bulkhead design a r e  possible approaches. 
Double hatches, explosively 
Special equipment identified by this study includes (1) retro-reflectors for DV 
spin rate and nutation determination, (2) yo-yo o r  rocket de-spin systems, 
(3) spare EVA suits, (4) spare oxygen candles, and (5) various spare DV-SRV 
communications aids. 
5.5.2 Space Rescue Vehicle Design Features 
An SRV will require special rescue equipment, as well a s  equipment to deal 
with environmental hazards caused by a DV, in order to successfully perform 
diverse rescue operations. 
Estimates indicate that under the most favorable rescue situation the time 
required from rendezvous to cast-off is approximately one hour. 
if communication is broken, the DV is critically damaged and/or tumbling, 
medical aid is required, and transfer to and from the SRV is by EVA, then 
the rescue timeline could exceed 24 hours. 
However, 
Long RC work periods can be anticipated. Equipment carried aboard the SRV 
should, therefore, be designed not only fo r  low weight, volume, and cost, 
but to emphasize low operations time as well. 
EVA suit acclimating time and to lower the EVA activity demands on the RC. 
Consideration of higher pressure EVA suits, platform-type AMU's, and 
shirtsleeve work capsules appears highly desirable. 
Steps a r e  necessary to reduce 
5.6 RECOMMENDED EQUIPMENT LIST 
Based upon the assumption that all  emergencies will occur with equal probability, 
a recommended list of useful equipment for  a manned rescue mission is given 
in Table 5. Further equipment screening should be possible when the relative 
probability of occurrence is established fo r  each emergency situation. For  an 
unmanned SRV, a reduction of the items on board the SRV can be made. 
1 
.... 
-40- 
Table 5. Recommended Equipment for Manned SRV 
~ .' .. J 
Weight, lb 
Communications and Survey Equipment 700 
Despin Devices 2 50 
Soft-Docking Fixt;ure 250 
Attachable Docking Fixture 800 
Portable Airlock 1600 
EVA Suits 70 
AMU Backpack 150 
Manipulator (Shirtsleeve) 2000 
Transfer Capsule 500 
Sampling and Analysis K i t  50 
D a m a g e  Control Equipment 150 
Remote Manipulator 1000 
Medical Ki t  60 
Extended Survival K i t  500 
Tethers (umbilicals) 45 
Personnel Car r ie rs  10 
Mis cellaneou s 200 
-41 - 

6. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
6.1 GENERAL 
There a r e  numerous operational factors which have impact on the escape 
and rescue problem. 
(DV) and a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) in the period between rendezvous 
of the SRV at the DV and departure of the SRV were treated in Section 5. It 
was the purpose of this next phase of the study to examine some of the other 
important operational factors. They include: 
The detailed operations involving a distressed vehicle 
a. Ground-based reaction time 
b. Emergency AV requirements 
C .  Communications 
d. Recovery site location 
6.2 GROUND-BASED RESCUE REACTION TIME 
6.2.1 Introduction 
All transportation from earth to space in the Integrated Program is via the 
Earth Orbit Shuttle. Any ground-based rescue system will ,  therefore, 
involve the EOS and will be limited by its operational characteristics. 
paramount interest then a re  the EOS launch reaction time on the ground and 
the time required for ascent and rendezvous with a DV after launch. 
comparison of this total reaction time characteristic to the estimated allow- 
able reaction time would afford some measure of the potential effectiveness 
of the EOS as  a ground-based rescue system. 
Of 
A 
In this regard, pertinent available material related to (1) allowable time 
delay, (2)  ascent and rendezvous time, and ( 3 )  launch reaction time was 
reviewed to provide some insight into this complex problem area.  
6 .2 .2  Allowable Time Delay 
The time within which aid must be provided in order to prevent crew fatalities 
is, of course, dependent on the nature of the particular emergency situation 
-43 - 
on board the distressed vehicle. At one extreme, violent explosions could 
occur which result in 100-percent crew fatality immediately, with no need 
for rescue. 
for a crew on an otherwise functioning spacecraft might afford as  long as  
several weeks to respond to their need. 
postulate a myriad of possible situations with widely varying time- response 
needs. 
At the other extreme, the foreseeable diminution of life support 
Between these extremes, one could 
Determination of the most likely emergency situations and their attendant 
time-response characteristics was beyond the scope of this study. 
there a re  results from three previous study efforts which tend to shed some 
light on this problem area.  Figure 11 summarizes the previous information 
pertaining to emergency time effects. 
However, 
The figure depicts the change in crew fatalities a s  a function of time from the 
onset of the emergency. 
situation, with initial crew fatalities in the 2-to-20 percent range. 
increase in crew fatalities beyond this initial figure then would be primarily 
caused by (1) lack of required medical aid, (2)  continued exposure to the 
hazardous condition, and ( 3 )  diminution of required life support. 
rising crew fatality incidence beyond the five-day time period is indicative 
of ultimate loss of life support. 
All studies assumed a non-catastrophic emergency 
Any 
The sharply 
Also shown in the figure is one assessment of the effect of manned assistance, 
and one assessment of the effect of containment and escape. Containment in 
this case refers to spacecraft compartmentation to allow crewmen to retreat  
to a safe haven on board the DV. Escape refers to the ability to depart from 
the DV in a device affording shelter and life support while awaiting further aid. 
:i 
... 
The information in the figure is not presented to infer that a time-response 
characteristic for Integrated Program emergencies is well-defined, but 
merely to illustrate, based on available estimates, that crew fatalities tend 
to increase rather rapidly from approximately one day after the onset of a 
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non-catastrophic emergency, unless escape provisions a r e  provided. 
be inferred that "self-help" remedial systems would be most effective in those 
periods immediately following the emergency, and that earth-based rescue 
systems most probably a re  faced with the conditions present in the one- to 
ten-day period following the onset of the emergency. 
and rendezvous response specification of 24 hours is indicated in the figure. 
However, as  previously shown in Section 5, mere  rendezvous with the DV is 
not the total answer. 
operations. 
It can 
The current EOS ascent 
Additional time is required for the ensuing rescue 
6.2.3 Ascent and Rendezvous Time 
An analysis was performed to determine the time required after launch from 
ETR for an EOS to ascend to and rendezvous with a target in a 270 n mi, 55 
inclination earth orbit. 
At one extreme, if the vehicle orbit is coplanar with ETR and optimally phased 
(no parking orbit phasing required), the ascent and rendezvous can be per- 
formed within approximately 1.5 hours after liftoff. 
the worst combination of out-of-plane and phasing. These results a r e  a s  
shown in Figure 12. Were, the total time for ascent and rendezvous is a 
function of the Orbiter AV available in the 50 X 100 n mi parking orbit. 
At the other extreme is 
The singular point at approximately 38.5 hours represents the EOS Orbiter 
in-plane-ascent case, with a AV budget of 1100 ft /sec for ascent and rendez- 
vous. If additional AV were available to perform plane changes and parking 
orbit phasing, the solid line extending downward from the circled point indi- 
cates that the time could be reduced to about 18.5 hours with 4000 f t /sec AV. 
Additional AV beyond that value involves direct ascent, which could further 
reduce the time to about 15 hours with 15,000 ft /sec AV, a value that is well  
beyond the EOS Orbiter capability. 
..., 
The nominal Orbiter AV capability is approximately 1500 f t /sec although its 
propellant tanks are sized ford2000 ft /sec.  As can be seen, under the 
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worst-case conditions assumed, the EOS would require about 35 hours to 
perform the ascent and rendezvous maneuver. 
One other ascent and rendezvous situation was examined. This analysis was 
directed to the situation where the target vehicle orbit was "subsynchronous" 
(repeating ground track) and ideally phased, and a northerly coplanar ETR 
launch opportunity had just been missed. The answer sought was whether or 
not a southerly launch of the EOS would substantially reduce the 25.5 hour 
delay to rendezvous required by waiting for the next northerly launch 
opportunity. 
The problem scenario is depicted in Figure 13 and indicates that (1) an in- 
plane southerly launch can be made approximately 9 hours after the missed 
in-plane northerly launch opportunity, ( 2 )  the target vehicle i s  then approxi- 
mately 150" ahead of the EOS in phase angle, (3)  phasing of the EOS in the 
100 n mi parking orbit for 8.8 hours would be required, and (4) the final 
rendezvous with the target vehicle could be made about 6 hours sooner than 
by waiting for the next northerly launch opportunity. 
6.2.4 Launch Reaction Time 
The ground delay in reacting to an emergency i s  a Eunction of (1) the number 
of launch pads, (2)  the boosters and orbiters procured, (3)  the frequency and 
duration of missions, and (4) characteristics related to EOS refurbishment 
time, countdown requirements, payload installation time , and available work 
force. 
Table 6 illustrates such launch reaction time results (on a maximum and 
minimum basis) for a considerable range of the above forcing variables. 
the maximum side, i t  can be seen that from 1.5 to 6 days may be required 
for launch reaction. 
On 
The singular minimum reaction t h e  of 12 hours results from the specific case 
where (1) an EOS has just been counted down to T-2 hours (where fueling is 
to commence) when the emergency is declared, (2) 10 hours a r e  required to 
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h 
remove the mission payload and insert  a special rescue payload, and (3) the 
final two-hour fueling period begins immediately after the payload change, 
followed by immediate launch. Obviously, this would be an extremely un- 
likely situation. 
6.2.5 Summary 
The worst-case ascent to a 270 n mi, 55" inclination orbit is in-plane and to 
a randomly positioned target. Only phasing in a parking orbit at an interme- 
diate altitude is required; no plane change maneuver is involved. 
mately 38 hours a r e  required to reach the target from ETR with a AV expendi- 
ture of about 1100 fps from an initial 50 x 100 n mi orbit. 
reduced by combining parking orbit phasing with plane changing. 
ascent, which involves extensive plane changes, provides an even greater time 
reduction. However, such procedures a re  a t  the expense of large AV expendi- 
tures. 
100 n mi orbit. 
for a combination of phasing and plane change, the total ascent and rendezvous 
time can only be reduced to 35 hours. 
Approxi- 
This time may be 
Direc t  
The present Orbiter AV capability provides only 1500 fps in the 50 x 
Even if this entire amount is expended in an optimal fashion 
The subsynchronous (repeating ground track) case offers some improvement. 
The ascent and rendezvous delay following a "just-missed'' launch opportunity 
i s  approximately 26 hours. If the EOS all-azimuth launch capability and a 
southerly launch opportunity a r e  utilized, the time delay can be reduced to 
about 20 hours. 
It is estimated that the maximum ground delay in  reacting to an emergency can 
be between 1.5 and 6 days. 
launch pads, boosters, and orbiters available, and the frequency and duration 
of missions. 
The actual time will depend upon the number of 
A reaction time of 24 hours or  less  is desirable in order to prevent further 
fatalities after the initial event. 
reaction time appears unrealistic. 
cated equipment in order to achieve an acceptable ground-based reaction time 
However, the EOS specification of a 24-hour 
The anticipated delays may require dedi- 
'> with the EOS. 
-51-  
6.3 EMERGENCY AV REQUIREMENTS 
6.3.1 Introduction 
When emergencies occur prior to mission completion, some AV usually 
remains available, unless the emergency is related to a propulsion system 
failure. This available AV, i f  sufficient, could be used to perform a mid- 
course abort or  perhaps a fast return to an orbit containing a safe haven. 
Externally provided rescue may be necessary for emergencies where any 
remaining AV is inadequate for abort o r  return, o r  where the available AV 
cannot be applied. 
These considerations were examined with respect to (1) a distressed vehicle 
(DV) on geosynchronous and lunar missions, and (2)  a space rescue vehicle 
(SRV) responding to distressed vehicles in low earth orbit, geosynchronous, 
and lunar missions. The results a r e  summarized in the following sections, 
with the complete analysis and results presented in Appendix E. 
6.3.2 Distressed Vehicle Requirements 
6.3.2.1 Geosynchronous Mission 
In the case of the geosynchronous mission, the specific situations examined 
were: 
a. A DV in ascent from low earth orbit to geosynchronous 
orbit and having the requirement to perform a mid- 
course abort at  approximately 2000 n mi altitude 
A DV in geosynchronous orbit and desiring to perform a 
fast return to low earth orbit from geosynchronous orbit 
b. 
In the first  case, the analysis indicated that approximately 15, 000 f t /sec AV 
would be required to perform the mid-course abort maneuver, with an elapsed 
time of about I. 5 hours (after Hohmann Transfer Ellipse insertion) to return 
to low earth orbit. 
chronous orbit and return to low earth orbit, approximately 20,000 f t /sec AV 
would remain after initiating the Hohmann Transfer, indicating that this type 
of mid-course abort is indeed feasible. 
For a vehicle nominally designed to ascend to geosyn- 
2 
.... Y .,. 
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In the second case, the nominal time to return to low earth orbit (LEO) from 
geosynchronous orbit (CEO) is 5 . 3  hours with a AV requirement of about 
14,000 ft /sec for retrograde, mid-course corrections and LEO circulariza- 
tion. 
could reduce the time to return to LEO from GEO to approximately 3 . 5  hours. 
The analysis indicated that the utilization of an  additional 2200 ft/sec 
Table 7 summarizes these results for the GEO mission. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 2  Lunar Mission 
In the case of the lunar mission, the specific situations examined were: 
a .  A DV in earth-to-lunar transit  and having the requirement 
to perform a mid-course abort after trans-lunar injection 
(TLI) 
A DV in earth-to-lunar transit and desiring to perform a 
fast return to LEO without lunar orbit injection (LOI) 
b. 
In the first case,  it was assumed that the DV was a mission vehicle with the 
nominal AV capacity to travel to the moon and return to LEO, and was on a 
free-return trajectory to the moon. 
of approximately 17,000 f t /sec remaining at the time of the requirement for 
abort, and could therefore successfully perform a mid-course abort and 
return to LEO with a total elapsed time of about 35 hours after TLI. If the 
vehicle had an additional AV of 8000 f t /sec (total AV - 2 5 , 0 0 0  f t /sec) ,  the 
time to return to LEO would be reduced to about 20  hours. 
As such, the vehicle would have a AV 
In the second case, the same vehicle, having just decided not to perform the 
LO1 maneuver, could use the 17,000 f t /sec AV to return to LEO i n  approxi- 
mately 48 hours after trans-earth injection, (TEI). If this AV could be aug- 
mented by 2000 f t /sec,  the return time to LEO could be reduced to about 36  
hours. The above results a r e  summarized in Table 8. 
6 .3 .3  Space Rescue Vehicle Requirements 
A number of potential bases for  stationing the SRV were considered, including 
LEO, GEO, lunar orbit (LO), and the lunar surface base (LSB). The SRV 
AV needs calculated pertain only to the trajectory changes needed to go from 
-53 -  
c 
0 
.r( 
m 
m 
2 
0 
W 
0 
k 
0 w 
m a 
a, 
; 
a > 
a, 
L) 
4 
> 
a, 
m 
rn 
a, 
k 
c, rn 
6 
r 
a, 
Q 
cd 
E-r 
4 
k c 
0" w 
J 
0 u 
i 
i= 
m 
w a 
$ a 
- 
0 
0 
0 
* 
2 
* 
d 
a, 
rd 
rd 
p" 
4 
.I+ 
2 
a 
0 
(v 
N 
b a 
5 
a, 
c u 
; 
4 
M 
h 
H 
E-l z 
t: 
k 
a, 
cd 
m 
Y 
d 
2 
a, 
rd 
cd 
p" 
d 
.I+ 
2 
m 
w a 
$ a 
0 
0 
0 
M 
b 
E4 
a 
a, 
c c, 
; 
3 
M 
I4 
I4 
E-r 
& 
k 
a, 
rd 
k 
0 
P 
a, 
m 
k 
0 u 
c, 
4 
3 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
N 
x 
a 
a 
a, 
c u : 
3 
M 
. .. ... 
-54-  
. ,  
. _I' 
the SRV base to the DV and return to 
another designated safe haven. They 
the base of origin of the SRV or  to 
do not include any AV associated with 
emplacing the SRV at its base or  maintaining it at that position, o r  for 
rendezvous and docking operations. 
The presentation below is organized to show which SRV basing concept is 
preferable in  order to minimize SRV AV requirements. 
the maximum and minimum AV requirements for each basing concept are 
shown in this report section. Appendix E discusses the AV requirements of 
emergency situations falling between these extremes. 
For this reason only 
6.3.3.1 Geosynchronous Mission 
In the case of the geosynchronous mission, the specific situations representing 
the range of AV requirements were: 
SRV based in GEO 
A. DV is in transit from LEO to GEO and on an escape 
trajectory (unable to circularize at GEO). 
DV is in  GEO and unable to depart GEO. B. 
SRV based in LEO 
C. DV is in  GEO and unable to depart GEO. 
D. DV i s  in  mid-course abort from ascent to GEO 
trajectory and has no LEO injection capability. 
In all of the above situations, the SRV was assumed to return to LEO after 
performing the rescue. 
In situation A, the AV required for the SRV was determined to be 14,000 t f(X) 
ft /sec,  where X is the overspeed imparted to the DV at the Hohmann Transfer 
injection on the ascent leg  of the DV trajectory to GEO. The "f(X)" AV is that 
required to rendezvous with the DV in  its flyby trajectory. The 14,000 f t l sec  
is that portion associated with conventional return from GEO to LEO. 
detailed commentary on I1f(X)" values is given in Appendix E. 
A more 
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In situation B, the SRV is in  GEO; therefore it only needs the nominal 
-14,000 ft/sec to return the DV crew to LEO. 
In situation C, the LEO-based SRV needs the full - 28,000 f t /sec normally 
associated with transit  to and from GEO. 
In situation D, a minimum of - 16,000 ft/sec was determined for a LEO-based 
SRV to rendezvous with the DV in mid-course abort conditions and reenter 
LEO with the DV crew. 
Table 9 summarizes the results for these situations which represent the 
maximum and minimum SRV AV requirements. 
6 . 3 . 3 . 2  Lunar Mission 
In the case of the lunar mission, the situations representing the extremes of 
the requirements spectrum were: 
SRV based at LSB 
A. DV is in transit  from LEO and on an impact trajectory 
toward the moon. 
DV is in  transit  from LEO to moon and has made an 
incomplete lunar orbit injection (LOI) maneuver. 
B. 
SRV based in  Lunar Orbit near Orbiting Lunar Station (OLS) 
C. 
D. 
DV is in transit  from LEO andon an impact trajectory 
toward the moon. 
DV is in  transit  from LEO to moon and has made an 
incomplete LO1 maneuver. 
SRV based in LEO 
E. 
F. 
DV is in  LO and unable to depart LO. 
DV is in trans-earth trajectory from moon and unable 
to perform LEO injection. 
In situation A, the LSB was assumed as the safe haven. - 39,000 ft/sec was determined to be required by the SRV to ascend from the 
LSB, rendezvous with the DV prior to impact, and return the DV crew to the 
LSB . 
A maximum AV of 
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In situation B, the OLS was assumed as the safe haven. 
the LSB requires at least i1,OOO f t /sec AV to ascend to the DV, rendezvous, 
and return the DV crew to the OLS. 
An SRV based at 
In situation Cy the haven was assumed to be in LEO. 
OLS requires a maximum of 22 ,000  f t / sec  AV to travel from the OLS to the 
incoming DV, rendezvous with the DV prior to impact, and continue with the 
DV crew to LEO. 
An SRV based at the 
In situation D, the haven was assumed to be the OLS. 
OLS requires at least 4400 f t /sec A V  to travel from the OLS to the DV in its 
elliptic lunar orbit, rendezvous, and return the DV crew to the OLS. 
An SRV based at the 
In situation E, the safe haven was assumed to be in LEO. 
LEO requires a maximum of 27 ,000  f t /sec AV to travel to LO from LEO, 
rendezvous with the DV in  LO, and return the DV crew to LEO. 
An SRV based in 
In situation F, the safe haven was again assumed to be in LEO. 
SRV requires at least 20 ,000  f t /sec to travel from LEO to meet the DV which 
was unable to perform LEO injection (upon return from lunar a rea)  and return 
the DV crew to LEO. 
A LEO-based 
In any of the above situations entailing transfer between the lunar surface and 
lunar orbit, at least one 90" plane change requirement was included in  deter- 
mining the SRV AV needs. 
Table 10 summarizes these results which are  of interest in deciding where to 
base an SRV to deal with lunar mission emergencies. 
6 . 3 . 4  Summary 
For emergencies which occur prior to mission completion, some AV usually 
remains available. 
orbit appear feasible from either geosynchronous or  lunar mission trajectories 
with the remaining QV aboard the distressed vehicle. 
Both a mid-course abort or a fast return to low earth 
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Externally provided rescue may be necessary for emergencies where the 
remaining AV i s  inadequate or  cannot be applied. 
Rescue Vehicle (SRV) depends upon the mission of the distressed vehicle 
and where the SRV i s  based. For lunar mission emergencies, basing the SRV 
in lunar orbit imposes the least  AV requirement (-22,000 fps, max). 
geosynchronous mission emergencies, synchronous earth orbit basing imposes 
the least AV requirement. 
The AV needed by a Space 
For 
6.4 COMMUNICATION RE QU IREMENTS 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Integrated Program communications requirements can be simplified by the 
orbits selected for  the program. 
altitude, - 55" inclination) and the nominal translunar injection orbit (-260 n 
mi altitude, -31.5' inclination) w e r e  considered to be l'subsynchronous''; 
i. e . ,  they give a repeating ground track, with the ground track cycle repeating 
every 15 orbits. Such orbits can simplify operational requirements and appear 
desirable from a safety standpoint because the communications, tracking, and 
reentry operations a re  no longer random processes.  
The nominal space station orbit (-270 n mi 
6.4.2 Rescue Operations Needs 
The various types of communications needed for a rescue mission were 
established by assuming (1) a rescue control center, RCC (2)  a distressed 
vehicle, DV, and (3)  a rescue vehicle, SRV, and then determining the various 
information needs for the entire rescue operation. The specific time periods 
of interest included: 
a. prior to emergency 
b. emergency declared 
c. SRV enroute to DV 
d. SRV-DV engagement 
e. SRV return 
.... 
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6.4.2.1 Pr ior  to Emergency /Eme rgency Declared 
During the period just prior to the existence of an emergency and just after 
the emergency is declared, a number of communications links a r e  necessary 
between the RCC and the DV to enable a successful rescue mission. 
radio is desirable for status reports from the DV to the RCC, and for trans- 
mitting instructions from the RCC to the DV. 
mit any caution and warning or diagnostics data from the DV to the RCC, as 
well as  to permit guidance update data transmission o r  remote command 
activation from the RCC to the DV. 
periodic tracking of the DV. 
provide useful supplemental information as  to the nature and extent of the 
emergency on board. 
links schematically. 
Voice 
Telemetry is required to trans 
Tracking beacons would be required for 
The availability of television on the DV might 
Figure 14 illustrates these DV-RCC communication 
It should be noted that the rescue control center need not be earth-based, but 
could be space-based as  well. 
6.4.2.2 SRV Enroute to DV 
In the period commencing with notice to the SRV of the DV emergency and 
the command to respond, similar communication links a re  required between 
the RCC and the SRV as between the RCC and the DV. 
diagnostics data as  well  as tracking information (beacons), from the SRV 
should also be transmitted to the RCC. 
instructions to the SRV and status reports from it .  
between the DV and the RCC a re  still  necessary, as  before. 
Caution, warning, and 
Voice radio links would provide 
The communications links 
Figure 15 illustrates the DV-RCC-SRV communications links during this 
period. 
6.4.2.3 Res cue Operations (Rendezvous to Disengagement) 
During the rescue operations period (from rendezvous of the SRV with the DV 
to the subsequent disengagement), the previous DV-RCC and SRV-RCC com- 
munications links a r e  still required and need to be augmented by additional 
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links between the SRV and DV as  follows. 
the SRV and DV is required to enable status or damage control reports from 
the DV to the SRV and to enable instructions or medical advice to be given by 
the SRV to the DV. In the absence of a radio link, visual means (blinkers, 
etc. ) might be employed. 
from the DV to the SRV, as  well as tracking information (from beacons), 
would also be useful to facilitate the rendezvous operation. 
Voice radio communication between 
Diagnostics or damage sensor data transmission 
As a backup mode, the RCC could link the SRV to the DV during this period. 
Figure 16 illustrates the situation. 
6.4.2.4 Disengagement to Landing 
During the period following the in-space operations between the SRV and DV, 
the previously defined SRV-RCC communications links a r e  still required. It 
is also desirable to maintain the telemetry and beacon links between the DV 
and RCC to facilitate continued tracking of the DV, guidance update trans- 
mission to the DV, having status information of the DV, and any later remote 
command activation functions. 
Figure 17 represents the communications links during the period until the 
SRV is safely returned. 
pleted its mission. 
The SRV links will  not be required after i t  has com- 
6.4.2.5 Summary 
The foregoing serves to illustrate the basic communications requirements 
that may be necessary to fulfill the requirements of a rescue mission. As 
can be noted, voice radio, telemetry, and tracking beacons a r e  the basic 
system needs, while TV may be useful to provide supplemental information. 
... 
It can also be seen that such communication links, from a safety standpoint, 
should be continuous and near realtime to permit the flow of vital information 
in a timely manner. 
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6.4.3 Planned Facilities 
Initial facilities planned for the communications /tracking functions of the 
Integrated Program include (i ) the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) 
and (2)  an Intelsat IV type of relay satellite in  geosynchronous orbit. 
Alone, the MSFN does not provide continuous tracking and communications 
coverage. 
55 inclination "subsynchronous" (repeating ground track) orbit. Shown are 
the ground tracks resulting in both maximum and minimum communications 
interruptions (84 minutes and 17 minutes, respectively). Similarly, the 
lunar departure orbit (260 n mi, 31.5 
"blackouts" of 80 minutes maximum and 27 minutes minimum. 
mi, however, there is no blackout period for either intransit lunar or geo- 
synchronous vehicles. For the lunar orbit situation, blackout periods of up 
to 60 minutes can occur on the back side of the moon at the nominal 60 n mi 
altitude. 
The addition of an Intelsat IV type of relay satellite in geosynchronous orbit 
eliminates these blackout periods, except for the lunar orbit blackout. 
For example, Figure 18 illustrates the case for the 270 n mi, 
inclination) has communications 
Above 7000 n 
Table 1 1  summarizes the MSFN capability as  delineated above. 
> P
Additional Integrated Program facilities under consideration include advanced 
data relay satellites in both geosynchronous and lunar orbits and eliminate all 
blackout periods. 
6.4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
An examination of the basic communication and tracking needs for a rescue 
mission shows the need for voice radio, telemetry, and tracking beacons. It 
further indicates that such communications links, from a safety standpoint, 
should be continuous in nature to effect the flow of vital information in a 
timely manner. 
The existing Manned Space Flight Network does not provide continuous tracking 
and communications 
periods approaching 
coverage. For the low earth orbits of interest, blackout 
1.4 hours may be experienced. Above approximately 
-67- 
B 
c, 
..$ 
. .. 
i 
d 
d 
0 
Ln 
In 
d 
'S 
c- 
N 
*E 
c 
0 
0 
0 
c- 
1 
a, > 
0 
P 
cd 
a, 
c 
.. 
- 69- 
7000 n mi, continuous communication is feasible during the intransit phases 
of geosynchronous and lunar missions. 
Initial facilities projected for the Integrated Program include augmenting the 
MSFN with an Intelsat IV type relay satellite to eliminate these blackout 
periods. However, lunar blackout for spacecraft behind the moon would 
continue. 
data relay satellites in both earth and lunar orbit, thus eliminating all blackouts. 
Plans a r e  to ultimately eliminate the MSFN and to use advanced 
From a safety viewpoint, facilities to skin track an "inactive" vehicle, i. e . ,  
a spacecraft unable to transmit or offer a communications target, a r e  
desirable. 
the MSFN will have this capability. 
It is unclear, at present, whether the facilities planned to replace 
6.5 GROUND RECOVERY SITE ASSESSMENT 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The nature of space emergencies may require a rapid return to earth because 
of crew injury or equipment failure. Irrespective of the mission, the last  leg 
of a return to earth is from low earth orbit and is currently planned to be via 
the Orbiter stage of the Earth Orbit Shuttle. 
however, not always possible, and waiting periods in space may be required 
before an appropriate return opportunity occurs. 
mined by the Orbiter position in space, its operational characteristics, and 
the location of available landing sites. 
i: 
Immediate Orbiter return is, 
This waiting time is deter- 
The Orbiter horizontal landing feature implies a landing capability at most 
cornrnercial airports. 
prepared sites where appropriate ground support has been provided. 
the landing need not necessarily be made at the launch site, a single launch 
and landing site may be operationally preferred. 
However, i ts  landing must, in fact, be restricted to 
Although 
No final selection of a launch site has, as  yet, been made. 
is the Eastern Test Range (ETR). 
Orbiter crossrange and the number and location of available alternate landing 
sites on the reentry waiting time, using ETR as  the launch site. 
One of the candidates 
An analysis was made to assess  the effect of 
I 
-70 - 
6.5.2 Approach and Scope of Analysis 
The return opportunities from two low earth orbits were examined in detail. 
One corresponds to the orbit of the Space Station, namely, 270 n mi altitude 
and 55" inclination. 
corresponds to the orbit of the Orbiting Propellant Depot which provides pro- 
pellant storage for vehicles operating between earth orbit and lunar orbit. 
Both of these orbits z r e  subsynchronized with the earth rotation to assure  at 
least one in-plane and in-phase EOS launch opportunity every day. 
resulting ground tracks repeat after 15 orbital revolutions; i. e. , the tracks 
for the first and 16th revolutions coincide. The OPD orbit has an additional 
property in that the regression rate of the orbital plane is synchronized with 
lunar orbital rates and provides periodic departure opportunities for transfer 
to the moon. 
The other, 260 n mi altitude and 31.5" inclination, 
The 
It is assumed that the Orbiter is in one of these orbits and, following its 
participation in a rescue mission or  an emergency of i ts  own, seeks to return 
/ to earth as rapidly as  possible. Three versions of the Orbiter were considered, 
each having a different crossrange capability. 
range value is currently 1100 n mi, a lower value of 200 n mi and a higher 
value of 1500 n mi were also examined. The ability of each version of the 
Orbiter to reach selected landing sites from each of the 15 different ground 
tracks was then determined. 
were considered. 
Ramey AFB, Bermuda, a r e  either within the Continental United States (CONUS) 
or at U.  S. possessions. 
Although the nominal cross- 
In addition to ETR, eight other landing sites 
All alternate si tes have 10,000-ft runways and, except for 
Included as alternate sites are: 
6.5.3 
Edwards AFB 
Wendover AFB 
El Paso 
Discussion of Results 
Hawaii 
Wake 
Guam 
Puerto Rico 
Bermuda 
Complete results are presented in Appendix D, and several specific examples 
a re  treated in  the next two sections. 
i 
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6.5.3.1 270 n mi, 55" Inclination Orbit 
The return opportunities at each of the nine landing sites considered are 
tabulated according to the orbit number in Table 12 for a crossrange of 
1100 n mi. 
be reached for a landing. 
the effect of having more than one landing site available. 
presented on the figure, one an  optimum combination of si tes,  and the other 
a random selection with Edwards AFB as the second available site. 
represent worst-case situations for the combinations of sites involved. 
An "X" indicates the orbits f rom which the designated site can 
These data have been plotted in  Figure 19 to show 
Two curves a r e  
Both curves 
The effect of crossrange on the worst-case waiting orbits for the optimum 
selection of landing sites is summarized in Figure 20. If ETR is the only 
landing site used, substantial orbital loiter could be  required. 
case,  an 1100 n mi crossrange could require an eight-orbit ( - 13-hour) 
landing delay. 
five alternate landing sites in addition to ETR. 
Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and Puerto Rico. With Edwards AFB as the only 
alternate, a seven-orbit reentry delay can be encountered. 
In the worst 
The minimum delay for this crossrange is  one orbit and requires 
They are: Edwards AFB, 
6.5.3.2 260 n mi, 3 1.5 Inclination Orbit 
Results for the OPD orbit are tabulated in Table 13 and plotted in Figure 21 
for the 1100 n mi crossrange case. 
waiting orbits is again the worst case. 
of landing sites for the three crossranges considered i s  given in Figure 22. 
For this orbit as well, an ETR-only landing site can require a substantial 
orbital loiter delay. 
be as long as nine orbital revolutions. 
and Guam as alternate landing sites, then one of these sites is available from 
every orbit, and no orbital loiter is required. 
with an 1100 n mi crossrange capability, a commonality of landing sites occurs 
for both orbits considered. 
For this latter figure, the number of 
A summary of the optimum grouping 
With an 1100 n mi crossrange capability, this delay can 
If ETR is augmented by Puerto Rico 
It i s  interesting to note that 
.j 
..... ..
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Table 12, Return Opportunities from 270 n mi 
5 5 "  Orbit - -  1100 n mi Crossrange 
7 --I 
9 i PUERTO 
I 
REV ETR EDWARDS WENDOVER H A W A I I  ELPASO WAKE GUAM R l C O  BERMUDA 
1 X X X 
V V V 
L A A A 
3 X X X X 
4 x x  X X X X X X 
5 x x  X X X 
' 6  X X 
1 7  X 
9 X 
10 X X 
11 X 
12 
13 X 
14 X X 
1 5 x x  X X X 
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Table 13. Return Opportunities from 260 n mi, 31. 5-Degree 
Orbit - -  1100 n mi  Crossrange 
PUERTO I 
I 
REV ETR EDVVARDS VVENDOVER HAvVAII EL PAS0 WAKE GUAM RlCO BERMUDA I 
1 x  X x .  X X X X X 
2 x  X X X X x x  X X 
I 
i 3 x  X X X X x x  X 4 X X X x x  
5 X x x  
x x  
x x  i 
11 X 
12 X X 
13 X X X 
14 X X X X X 
15 X X X X X X X 
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6.5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The ultimate resolution of any emergency is the recovery of the crew of the 
distressed vehicle and their safe return to earth. 
reentry and the probability of landing the Orbiter stage of the EOS at a pre- 
determined site is high, especially with its available crossrange. Reentry 
from low ear th  orbit following an emergency may, however, require a signi- 
ficant on-orbit loiter period. This reentry delay was examined as a function 
of crossrange, and number and location of recovery sites. 
The accuracy of planned 
With ETR as the launch and landing site, an 1100 n mi crossrange orbiter 
can encounter up to an eight-orbit ( - 13-hour) reentry delay. 
Continental U .  S. recovery site among those examined offers a shorter orbital 
reentry delay from a 270 n mi, 5 5 "  inclination orbit than ETR. 
CONUS recovery sites produce only a small improvement. 
and ETR a s  available recovery sites, the worst-case situation for an 1100 n mi 
crossrange capability requires a seven-orbit delay ( - 11 hours) before initiating 
reentry. 
be intolerable. 
significantly reduced. 
No single 
Multiple 
With both Edwards 
In the case of a medical emergency, this type of delay may prove to 
Only by adding a mid-Pacific recovery site can this delay be 
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7. REMEDIAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
7. 1 GENERAL 
Concern for  the safety of astronauts in the U . S .  manned space program 
has resulted in the identification of a number of devices or  approaches for 
providing either (1) crew escape from a distressed vehicle or (2) externally- 
supplied rescue. Configurational definition of such remedial systems has 
usually been made with reference to a specific space vehicle and mission, but 
none till now was ever formally implemented. 
The first official U. S. commitment for implementation of a space remedial 
system was the NASA announcement in March 1971 that a ground-based rescue 
system capability would be provided for the Skylab Program. 
any subsequent manned program, especially one of the scope of the Integrated 
Program, will also include plans for crew and passenger escape o r  rescue 
(Section 4). 
It is clear that 
The objective of the study effort discussed in this sectionwas to assess candi- 
date remedial systems for assuring crew and passenger survival on Integrated 
Program missions s o  that appropriate action can be implemented. 
7.2 METHOD O F  APPROACH 
The general method of approach followed consisted of two basic steps: 
a. identification of specific remedial systems potentially applicable 
to the Integrated Program problems 
comparison of these various alternate remedial systems b. 
The first step involved (1) review of potentially available devices and (2) con- 
ceptual identification of new devices. 
The second step required development anduse of a comparison and selection 
The results a r e  presented in Section 7. 3.  
technique (described summarily in Section 7.4 and in detail in Appendix J). 
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7.3 ESCAPE /RESCUE CONCEPTS 
Systems to support escape o r  rescue missions for the Integrated Program fall 
into three general categories: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) Other 
Direct use of planned program hardware 
Use of modified program hardware 
In category (a), primary candidate vehicles of the Integrated Program which 
could be used as  Space Rescue Vehicles (SRV's) include (listed in the order 
of their probable availability): 
1. Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS) 
2. Crew/Cargo Module 
3 .  Unmanned Space Tug 
4. Manned Space Tug 
5. Space Shuttle (SS) 
6. Lunar Landing Tug 
Each can be used independently for certain rescue missions. 
missions two o r  more can be combined into Space Rescue Vehicle Systems. 
Vehicles like the EOS, the Space Shuttle, and possibly the Manned Space Tug, 
would be used essentially as transporters to add additional performance capa- 
bility to the SRV actually performing the rescue operation. 
For other rescue 
To be used as SRV's, certain modifications for installing special equipment 
needed for space rescue operations may be required (see Appendix H). It is 
preferred that such equipment be carried in "palletized" form to the scene of 
the emergency. For the case where the EOS, Manned Space Tug, and Space 
Shuttle a r e  used a s  transporters, a minimum of modifications would be required. 
Table 14 shows an overview of Integrated Program hardware elements and 
combinations of these elements useful for rescue missions. 
of application is also given. 
The general area 
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i 
GEO 
LEO 
,t 
Table 14. Potential Rescue Mission Application Areas 
for Integrated Program Elements 
LO 
LEO 
t 
Element 
X 
X 
Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS) 
EOS & Unmanned Tug 
EOS & Crew/Cargo Module 
Space Shuttle (SS) 
SS & Unmanned Tug 
SS & Crew/Cargo Module 
SS & Manned Tug 
SS & Lunar Landing Tug 
Manned Tug 
Unmanned Tug 
Crew / Cargo Module 
Lunar Landing Tug 
X 
X 
LEO 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X I  
I x , x  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
LS 
LO 
t 
X 
X 
- 
LS 
X 
X 
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In category (b) a r e  included (I) modified Space Tug Crew Modules (TCM) to 
serve either as Bail-Out-and-Wait (BOW) devices or  as the habitable portion 
of a Bail-Out-and-Return (BOR) to safe haven device, and (2) modified EOS 
Crew/Cargo Modules (CCM) to serve as the basis of a rescue vehicle. 
In category (c) a r e  included the general concepts of (1) emergency life support 
systems, (2) Bail-Out -and-Wait devices, and (3) Bail-Out-and-Return devices. 
For convenience of presentation, the descriptions, content, and (where appro- 
priate) weight characteristics of the various remedial systems a re  discussed 
by concept, rather than category. 
7.3. 1 
The Orbiter stage of the EOS is the element of principal interest, since the 
Booster stage does not achieve orbit. 
process of detailed definition, some of its characteristics relevant to rescue 
capability a re  sufficiently well known for purposes of this study. 
Earth Orbit Shuttle as a SRV 
Although the Orbiter is still in the 
Figure 2 3  illustrates some of the more significant configurational features of 
a typical Orbiter. 
The present approach is to transfer crew and passengers f rom the Orbiter via 
a cargo or Crew/Cargo Module (CCM) carried in the 15-ft X 60-ft payload bay. 
The CCM contains a docking port a t  one end for the docking interface with the 
receiving vehicle, e. g . ,  space station. Under one approach (shown in the 
figure), the CCM hard-docks at one end while supported by an erecting and 
transporter mechanism extending from the Orbiter cargo bay. 
approach, the Orbiter can stand off f rom the station. 
ferred by either a Space Tug or  CCM-integral propulsion from the Orbiter to 
the station and docked. 
As can be seen, the Orbiter itself has no docking provisions. 
Under another 
The CCM is then trans- 
Two Orbiter hatches a r e  shown in Figure 23. 
a r ea  to permit EVA (EVA not planned as normal operational procedure), and 
the other separates the cargo bay from a tunnel leading to the crew compartment 
One exits the crew compartment 
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area. 
location; however, i t  is anticipated that similar airlock features may be 
provided for the EVA hatch. 
Current specifications require an airlock only at  the former hatch 
The actual positioning of passengers in the Orbiter is a s  yet not resolved. 
One approach locates the passengers immediately behind the crew until the 
time for  transfer, whereupon they enter the CCM. 
the passengers below the crew until transfer time. 
the passengers in the CCM for the entire mission. 
Another approach locates 
A third approach locates 
The orbital maneuvering AV capability of the Orbiter is very limited. Current 
specifications require 1500 fps AV available in the 50 X 100 n mi transfer orbit. 
This allows -300-400 fps after rendezvous at the reference 270 n mi, 55" 
inclination orbit, o r  -1000 fps if the Orbiter were circularized a t  a 100 n mi 
orbit. 
The true ground-based reaction time (launch reaction time plus ascent and 
rendezvous time) i s  not well defined. 
Section 6 .2 ,  however, it  appears that the current EOS specification requirement 
of 24 hours to rendezvous (after receipt of notice of emergency at space station) 
plus completion of all rescue aid in an additional 24 hours appears unrealistic. 
Based on the analyses presented in 
The Orbiter, designed as a mission vehicle, currently contains no special 
rescue equipment and aids as identified in Section 5 (debris detection and colli- 
sion avoidance sys tems, special radiation protection, EVA retrieval capability, 
tumbling a r res t ,  etc. ). As currently defined, its available AV is small, EVA 
i s  not planned, and it has no direct docking facilities. 
plished via a cargo module. However, the Orbiter can deliver rescue equipment 
to low earth orbit as cargo. 
Docking must be accom- 
.... 
7. 3.2 
Within the framework of Integrated Program planning, it is proposed that a Tug 
crew module (TCM) will be utilized with the Space Tug Propulsion Module in 
performing numerous earth-orbit and lunar -orbit missions, including descent 
Space Tug as a SRV 
-86- 
to and ascent f rom the lunar surface. 
completely defined, a limited amount of definition is available from the 
pre -phase A design activities. 
Although the TCM has not been 
The space tug system weight breakdown is given in  Appendix K as: 
Propulsion module 
- gross weight (including propellants) 71, 000 lb 
- propellants (Oz /Hz) 60,000 
Crew Module f 0, 000 
Guidance & control module 5 , 0 0 0  
Total (incl. propellants) 86, 000 lb 
Pre-phase A definition studies conducted by Boeing and North American 
Rockwell provide a limited insight into potential crew module configurational 
arrangement and subsystem features. 
Figure 24  illustrates a representative crew module (TCM) concept and, a s  
shown, incorporates a docking port, side hatch and airlock, and manipulator 
arm kit, in addition to providing a habitable haven for crew and passengers. 
The basic size (volume) tentatively selected is for a 3-4  man crew performing 
a reasonably-long-duration space mission (-28 days). 
indicate that the TCM could accommodate larger  numbers (to 15 men) for short- 
duration missions, particularly in an emergency situation. 
I 
_ -  
Contractor estimates 
Based on the space tug weight breakdown shown above, extensive orbital 
maneuvering capability (17, 000-18,000 fps) is available. 
case of the EOS, the tug incorporates no special rescue equipment or  aids. 
However, a s  in the 
The Space Tug appears to have considerable versatility as a remedial system 
for both earth and lunar emergencies. 
response o r  can be delivered upon demand by the EOS or the Space Shuttle. 
The Tug can be based in space for rapid 
-87-  
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Tug propulsion modules could be staged to provide a greater AV capability o r  
to propel special rescue vehicles weighing more than the standard tug crew 
module (TCM). 
7.3. 3 
Although the EOS Orbiter Crew/Cargo Module (CCM) is as yet undefined, its 
anticipated design includes having a crew module section plus a cargo module 
section and suggests that it could be modified into a useful SRV (Figure 25). 
Crew/Cargo Module a s  a SRV 
The modifications assumed were (1) a center section incorporating a self- 
contained RCS for attitude control and limited AV maneuvers (if the final standard 
CCM version is  not s o  configured), (2) the aft cargo section refitted to accom- 
modate crew and passengers from a distressed vehicle (including incapacitated 
members transported by personnel ca r r i e r s  (stretchers)) and to enable medical 
aid to be provided, and ( 3 )  the structure modified to accommodate a variety of 
special rescue equipment that may be appropriate for a rescue mission. Such 
j equipment may include portable airlocks, special transfer capsules , mani- 
pulator a rms ,  etc. 
Thus, one type of SRV could be simply a specially refitted CCM. 
and recovery a re  performed by the Earth-Orbit and Space Shuttles. 
maneuverability could be obtained by adding a propulsive stage to the module. 
Such an SRV would be useful for earth orbit and lunar mission emergencies. 
Both manned and unmanned versions a r e  possible. The latter depends upon 
self-help, whereas the former i s  the equivalent of a space emergency vehicle/ 
ambulance outfitted with special equipment designed for the rescue mission and 
a specially trained rescue crew. 
7. 3.4 Onboard Devices 
A number of remedial concepts have application if they are either stored on 
board, attached to, o r  in the immediate vicinity of a distressed vehicle (DV) at 
the time of an emergency. 
bail-out devices fall into this category. 
Its delivery 
Additional 
Emergency life support systems and a variety of 
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I ') 
Detailed descriptions a r e  presented in Appendix K. 
a r e  briefly summarized in the following sections. 
Only the salient features 
7. 3 . 4 .  i 
The simplest onboard solution is a selected assortment of life support 
subsystems in a packaged container. 
long-term storability aboard spacecraft and are used "only in case of emer-  
gency." 
to extending crew survival until an ultimate solution is provided. 
Emergency Life Support 
The container contents a r e  prepared for 
This concept is applicable to all spacecraft and missions but is  limited 
Although termed "onboard" generically, the package in fact could be attached 
to the vehicle via a porthole o r  "plug-in" arrangement to facilitate its use, 
instead of physically being within the confines of the vehicle's nominal 
structural envelope. 
Figure 26 illustrates the weight characteristics of such devices for 14- and 
28-day survival periods as a function of the number of crewmen being sustained. 
An EC/LS unit utilizing sodium chlorate candles for oxygen is employed. Initial 
pressurization is provided by high-pressure (.u2000 psi) bottled gaseous 
breathing atmosphere. 
- *  
C02 control is accomplished with molecular sieves. 
Waste management is similar to the Gemini approach. 
an overboard dump system (with tubes, valves, and accumulator t a n k )  while 
solid disposal is via a commode with a collector and blower. 
Urine disposal is via 
Thermal control is  provided by radiators, heat exchangers, and associated 
plumbing. 
Power is provided with a battery-solar a r r ay  combination. 
The food is  dried; water is  stored in tanks. 
-91- 
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7. 3.j4. 2 
The Bail-Out-and-Wait device (BOW) or  "lifeboat" is frequently suggested to 
permit a crew to disembark (escape) from an uninhabitable spacecraft and 
await rescue. 
ture with subsystems to provide for continued survival, stabilization, and 
communications during the waiting period. 
Bail -Out-And- Wai t  Devices 
In concept, the BOW device merely provides a habitable struc- 
Based on the foregoing definition, such a device is carried on board (or attached 
to) a space vehicle for emergency use in case it becomes a distressed vehicle 
(DV). 
storage volume is especially important. 
Long-term storability is desired and a lightweight structure with minimum 
The subsystems related to environmental control and life support were  selected 
as the same type previously described for Emergency Life Support Systems, 
since long-term storability is again required. 
attitude control system and a simple communications system were incorporated 
to facilitate the la ter  rescue operation. 
A small storable -propellant 
As to basic BOW structure, both expandable (XBOW) and rigid (RBOW) structure 
versions were considered. 
for BOW devices with 2-  and 28-day survival periods as a function of the number 
of crewmen being sustained. 
the Space Tug Crew Module (TCM) outer shell for basic structure. 
resulting from this selection a r e  the docking port, airlock, and side hatch, 
which were assumed inherent features of the TCM and are, therefore, "built in" 
to the RBOW. 
Figure 27 illustrates typical weight characteristics 
The rigid RBOW weights shown reflect the use of 
Benefits 
7.  3 . 4 .  3 Bail -Out -And -Return Devices 
Two general categories of bail-out-and-return-to-safe-haven devices were 
identified: return-to-earth and re turn-to-space haven. 
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7. 3.  4. 3.  1 
Much effort has been expended in the past in defining the capabilities and 
characteristics of devices with which one o r  more astronauts could escape 
from a distressed vehicle (DV) and reenter the earth’s atmosphere for an 
earth landing. 
Return-to-Earth BOR Devices 
One relevant study was primarily concerned with small (2 -3  men) devices 
(rigid and expandable) for reentry f rom low earth orbit. 
delineated rigid low earth orbit BOR devices with a greater capacity (3-9  men) 
and further explored the requirements for reentry from geosynchronous orbit 
for a 3-man BOR device. 
Another study 
The study reported herein summarized this existing data base and extended it 
to include a broader scope. The extensions included (1) extrapolating data to 
include BOR devices with up to 15-man capacity, and (2) calculating propulsion 
system weights to enable geosynchronous deorbit. 
Figure 2 8  illustrates typical expandable and rigid BOR configurations. 
shown a r e  estimated BOR weights for reentry from LEO and GEO. 
Also 
7.  3 . 4 .  3 . 2  
In the return-to-space haven concept, the BOR device is not faced with earth 
reentry and is, in its simplest form, a BOW device plus a propulsion module 
(PM) sized to provide the necessary AV for return to a space haven from the 
region of distress.  One special requirement is the guidance and navigation 
equipment (and associated instrumentation, etc. ) necessary to perform the 
AV maneuver and the subsequent rendezvous and docking operations. 
Return-to-Space Haven BOR Devices 
Both rigid and expandable structures were again considered in this application, 
and both storable and cryogenic propulsion modules were examined. Figure 29 
illustrates typical rigid and expandable BOR (space haven) configurations. 
Also shown a re  estimated weights for the crew module portions only of the BOR 
as a function of capacity (number of men, mission duration). In the rigid 
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. ” 
structure case, the Space Tug Crew Module (TCM) structural shell (including 
docking port, side hatch, and airlock) was selected to provide the basic 
habitable structure. 
sistent with long-term storability (as in the case of Emergency Life Support 
Systems) were again utilized. 
first aid, personal hygiene) were provided, as well as EVA equipment (suit, 
portable life support system (PLSS), and support equipment). Batteries were 
chosen to provide the electrical power for the communications, guidance and 
navigation, and instrumentation subsystems. 
Life support and environmental control subsystems con- 
Crew systems (seats, bunks, accessories, 
For the expandable Atructure case, all subsystems were identical to the rigid 
case described above, except for the structural shell. Here, the crew module 
(TCM) shell was replaced by an expandable structure. 
Both cryogenic (OZ/HZ) and storable propellants were considered. 
SP 
3 10 sec was considered representative of storable propellant systems, and 
450 sec was selected for the cryogenic (OZ/HZ) case. 
any desired return-to-space haven BOR device is  then the sum of the crew 
module weight given in Figure 29 plus the weight of a propulsion module. 
An I of 
The overall weight of 
7 .4  CONCEPTS COMPARISON 
7.4. 1 App roach 
The objective of this portion of the study effort was to compare the relative 
effectiveness and utility of the various candidate remedial concepts identified 
above, and to select a preliminary se t  of remedial systems appropriate to meet 
the potential emergencies of the Integrated Program. 
Eleven general mission categories (see Figure 37) were selected to represent 
the Integrated Program. Ten emergency situation categories we re previously 
identified (Figure 3).  
and emergency situation categories for examination. 
occurrence of any given emergency was not available (and beyond the scope of 
This results in 110 combinations of mission categories 
The probability of 
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this study). 
utilized to analyze this very large matrix. 
below and discussed in detail in Appendix J. 
Therefore a qualitative comparison and selection technique was 
The analysis technique is described 
7.4.1. I 
The analysis technique employed required that a distinction be made between 
"remedial means" and "remedial systems, '' defined as: 
Definitions and Ground Rules 
a. Remedial Means - -  a functional or  operational concept which 
provides the desired relief (or remedy) for a given specific 
emergency situation 
Remedial System - -  a hardware system which implements the 
functional o r  operational concept 
b. 
In this context nine remedial means were identified within the general categories 
of self-help, unmanned assistance, and manned assistance. In the self-help 
category the specific remedial means included: 
a. On-board supplies and equipment 
b. Bail-Out-and-Wait (BOW) devices 
c. 
d. Prepositioned Aid Packages (PAP) 
e. 
Bail-Out-and-Return to safe haven (BOR) devices 
Mission abort operations (to safe haven) 
The unmanned as  sistance category included: 
a. Shipped supplies and equipment 
b. Unmanned rescue vehicle (URM) with return to safe haven capability 
The manned assistance category included: 
a. 
b. Buddy system 
Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) with return to safe haven capability 
These remedial means are summarized in Table 15 and assigned a number 
(circled) which is used throughout the comparison and selection process to 
identify it. It should be noted that the "Buddy system, as utilized herein, does 
not require the use of identical twin systems, but does require two systems 
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1 
each with the capability to complete the mission or  return to a haven of safety. 
(Attached buddy vehicles a re  not included under this definition. ) 
7.4.  1 . 2  Selection Process 
The selection process involved two general steps: 
a. 
b. 
remedial means concept definition and selection 
remedial system definition and selection 
Within the first general step a number of discrete qualitative and subjective 
operations a re  required. First, for a single mission category (e. g . ,  space 
station in low earth orbit, LEOSS) and a single emergency situation (e. g.  , 
stranded/entrapped crew), the most critical aspect of the emergency was 
specified (e. g. , stranded in EVA). 
most effective in resolving the critical aspect of the emergency was selected 
from the nine available alternatives listed in Table 15. 
Then the particular "remedial means" 
The above operations were then repeated for  the same mission category for all 
of the ten emergency situation categories, and the minimum number of "remedial 
means" required to be effective over the entire emergency spectrum determined. 
This sequence was repeated for each of the eleven mission categories to deter-  
mine the minimum number of "remedial means" required to effectively deal with 
the entire emergency and entire mission spectrum. 
In the second step of the selection process, the critical requirements (perfor- 
mance capability, crew capacity, etc. ) were identified for each of the necessary 
remedial means concepts included in the minimum set. Then, candidate 
"remedial systems" were configured to implement the remedial means concepts. 
These "remedial systems" were then screened by comparison with selection 
cri teria to reduce the set  of candidate "remedial systems" to those most 
effective or  utilitarian. 
- 101- 
Finally, a second screening process was utilized to further reduce the 
candidate set  by combining functions, i. e. 
remedial system to satisfy the requirements of two or  more single-capability 
remedial systems. 
and comparison process were those then considered most applicable for 
implementation in the Integrated Program. 
configuring one broad-capability 
The remedial systems surviving the foregoing selection 
A logical additional (and final) step to the above process would be a further 
screening to identify a least-cost set  of remedial systems. 
a precise definition of total Integrated Program mission schedules, hardware 
element costs, etc. none of which i s  currently available, and therefore this 
selection process step was  beyond the scope of the study. 
This would require 
Figure 30 summarizes the foregoing selection process procedures in step-wise 
fashion. (See Appendix J for a detailed treatment. ) 
7 . 4 . 2  Remedial Means Selection 
The nine remedial means evaluated were previously listed in Subsection 7.4.  1. 1. 
In considering their applicability to any given emergency situation, the general 
guidelines employed were  that the rescue means should maximize: 
a. the speed of response 
b. 
c. 
the speed of return to a safe haven 
the aid required for a specific emergency 
In furtherance of these guidelines, the following application principles we re 
followed: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
Self-help capability is preferred, if adequate. 
Any selected remedial means must respond to the critical aspect 
(worst case) of a given emergency situation. 
The emergency situation may require backup remedial means 
selection. 
limit the capability of an otherwise totally-effective remedial 
means, and that practical limitations may be imposed by IP missions 
and hardware. ) 
(This follows from the fact that crew disability may 
j 
. .  ..,  
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In view of the foregoing guidelines and application principles, it was  possible 
to identify a preferred specific remedial means for various specific emergency 
situations. For example: 
a. 
b. 
A BOR device is always preferred for its direct return-to-haven 
capability . 
A BOW device is preferred in the situation only where spacecraft 
abandonment is required. 
A n  unmanned rescue vehicle (URM) is preferred for aid and 
retrieval of crew (including return to haven) if manned assistance 
is not specifically required. 
A manned rescue vehicle (SRV) is required where the DV crew 
is incapacitated or  unable to utilize self -help. 
c. 
d. 
Figure 31 illustrates one step in the remedial means selection process, wherein 
the single emergency situation "stranded o r  entrapped crew" is applied to each 
mission class. 
emergency situation is identified, and those remedial means most suitable fo r  
the critical condition selected. 
For  each mission class the most critical condition of the 
. $ . .,... 
For example, in the case of the low earth orbit space station (LEOSS), a crew 
member stranded in EVA was considered as the most critical condition under 
the general "stranded/entrapped" category. 
in nature, i. e. , the crew member is stranded only, not injured o r  ill, and 
therefore could help himself if means were available. 
self-help remedial means (a prepositioned aid package, PAP) was the preferred 
solution. The PAP could be such as to provide either a BOW or BOR function. 
If it were a BOR-type PAP, it could totally remedy the situation by enabling a 
return to a safe haven; if a BOW-type PAP, a paired solution means would be 
additionally required. In the latter case the URM is designated as the paired 
remedial means. 
Note that this condition is singular 
For  this condition, a 
Detail on treatment of other cases is presented in Appendix J. 
The entire spectrum of emergency situation categories and mission categories 
was examined in a similar fashion. 
selected as appropriate for each combination of emergency situation and 
mission category. 
Figure 32 indicates the remedial means 
There are three columns in each matrix box consistent 
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with the categories of self-help, unmanned assistance, and manned assistance 
a s  displayed in Table 15, and the identifying remedial means numbers a re  
also consistent with the numbers presented in Table 15. 
remedial means in  each instance is designated by a triangle. 
instances alternate approaches are feasible. 
The preferred 
In many 
. 
The significant results of the information in Figure 32 is summarized in 
Table 16, where the number of applications of any given type of remedial means, 
either as the desired o r  back-up means, is delineated. 
Onboard emergency supplies and equipment, 
because they were assumed to be on board in all cases, to the extent permitted 
by vehicle payload considerations. Mission abort, @ , is a procedural or 
operational capability and therefore was  not considered for remedial system 
configurational examination. 
dropped at  this point because of lack of application. 
aid packages (PAP), @ , were converted at this point to their more specific 
functions as BOW'S, @, and BORIS, @ , for further configurational 
examination. 
@ , were not shown in Figure 32 
Shipped supplies and equipment, @ , was  
Generic prepositioned 
Therefore, remedial means concepts @ , @ , @ , @ , and @ were 
determined to be those remedial means of sufficient application potential to 
warrant their further investigation in the next step of the analysis. 
7.4. 3 Remedial System Selection 
As previously indicated, the first step in the remedial system selection process 
was to establish the configuration, size, capacity, and weight of candidate 
remedial systems to provide the desired functional capabilities. 
In this regard, certain critical remedial system requirements were  identified 
(see Figure 33) to aid in remedial system sizing. Figure 34 is an abbreviated 
example of one such determination for BOR devices. 
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Table 16. Summary of Mission Applications 
Remedial Means 
On-Board Supplies and Equipment 
Bail-out and Wait (BOW) 
Bail-out and Return (BOR) 
Prepositioned Aid Pack (PAP)  
Mission Abort 
Shipped Supplies and Equipment 
Unmanned Rescue Vehicle (URM) 
Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) 
Buddy 
Numb e r of Applications 
Desired 
11 
- 
5 
4 
8 
- 
- 
8 
8 
Backup 
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CRITICAL REMEDIAL SYSTEM (RS) REQUIREMENTS TO BE DETERMINED: 
e CREW AND PASSENGER CAPACITY 
e RESPONSE TIME L I M I T S  
e M I S S I O N  DURATIONTO S I Z E E C I  LS 
e REQU I RED L V  (WHERE APPLl  CABLE) 
e STRUCTURAL (SHIELD INGS, ETC. 1 
e DOCKING SYSTEMS (WHERE APPLICABLE) 
Figure 33. Remedial System Requirements 
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Following critical requirement determination, remedial systems were 
synthesized (configuration, size, capacity, weight, etc. , determined) to the 
level necessary to support a comparison and selection process. 
the remedial system weight data presented in Section 7. 3 and Appendix K were 
utilized wherever possible. 
necessary to meet specific remedial system requirements. 
In this effort 
In some instances, modifications to this data were 
Tables 17, 18, and 19 illustrate the resulting definition of candidate BOR, BOW, 
URM, and SRV remedial systems. As can be noted, the resulting candidate 
remedial system set contains 5 BOW'S, 8 BORIS and 10 URM/SRV systems. 
In addition to these special remedial systems, the Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS), 
Space Tug, and Space Shuttle were available for  consideration both as "rescue" 
vehicles and as "transportation" vehicles for other remedial systems. 
"buddy system" design was retained for comparison purposes. 
The 
To aid in further comparison and selection operations, a number of selection 
criteria were  appliad to the candidate remedial systems (see Figure 35). An 
illustrative example of applying the first criteria (degree of aid) to the candi- 
date remedial systems is given in Figure 36 ,  where a higher number indicates a 
a greater degree of aid. The te rm "aid, as used herein, encompasses the 
total spectrum of response to a need; from direct physical assistance to trans- 
portation. 
final haven of safety was  assigned the greatest value. 
i 
As can be noted, the ability to provide an immediate return to a 
Table 20 is an example of applying the ranking procedure to the remedial systems 
appropriate for the low earth orbit space station (LEOSS), and Table 21 is a 
summary of the ranking factors for all remedial systems surviving the screening 
process (including estimated ROM costs). 
provide useful insight into the status and utility of a given remedial system. 
In general, the higher the ranking level the greater the preference as a remedial 
system. 
Such comparison and ranking factors 
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0 DEGREE OF A I D  
0 REACTION TIME 
I) 
0 DEVELOPMENT STATUS 
0 STATE OF ART 
0 FEASIBILITY OF MULTIPLE USE 
0 PRACTICALITY OF USE 
DV CREW PARTICIPATION (COMPLEXITY FACTOR) 
Figure 35. Remedial System Selection Criteria 
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The remedial systems considered to be most appropriate for the Integrated 
Program a r e  summarized in Figure 37 in terms of the particular missions 
which they apply. 
delineated below. 
7.4. 3. i New Equipment 
They a r e  discussed in detail in Appendix J and briefly 
to 
In the new equipment category is the XM, a small (3-man) expandable structure 
Bail-Out-and-Return to earth device, and the MTCM-I/PM, a storable propellant 
Bail-Out-and-Return to space haven device which utilizes a modified Tug Crew 
Module (MTCM) as the habitable portion. 
equipment. 
the EOS Orbiter in LEO. 
in GEO and LO. 
Only the P M  would constitute new 
The XM has application to the LEOSS, a manned Tug in LEO, and 
The MTCM-I/PM has application to a manned Tug 
7.4.  3.2 Modified Integrated Program Elements 
In the modified Integrated Program hardware element category are three rigid 
i bail-out-and-wait (RBOW) devices, and the EOS Crew/Cargo Module modified 
to serve as a Space Rescue Vehicle. The MCCM could be delivered by the 
EOS, a space tug propulsion module, o r  staged tug propulsion modules. 
All RBOW's a re  based on modifying Space Tug Crew Modules (TCM) to perform 
the bail-out-and-wait function. RBOW I (i5-man, 2 days) has application to the 
LEOSS, GEOSS, and the Space Shuttle in LEO, GEO, or  in transit to and f rom 
LEO/GEO. RBOW I1 (i5-man, 28 days) has application to either the LSB or  the 
OLS. 
or in transit  to and fromLO. 
RBOW 111 (3-man, 28 days) has application to the Space Shuttle in LO 
The MCCM and EOS combination (EOS/MCCM) is applicable to LEO situations 
(LEOSS, Tug in LEO, EOS in LEO, and Space Shuttle in LEO). 
The MCCM and tug propulsion module combination (Space Tug/MCCM) has 
application to the same LEO situations and also to geosynchronous (GEOSS, 
Tug in GEO, Space Shuttle in CEO or  transit) and some lunar situations (Tug 
- i 19- 
W 
W 
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in LO, Space Shuttle in LO or  transit). The MCCM and staged tug propulsion 
module combination (staged tug /MCCM) has application to the lunar situations 
of Tug on LS, and to LSB or OLS problems. 
7.4.3. 3 Planned Integrated Program Elements 
Basic unmodified planned Integrated Program elements also have remedial 
system application. 
TCM) have been proposed to act as  rescue vehicles in the Integrated Program; 
howeverytheir capacity to do so is limited by the fact that they do not (as 
presently defined) incorporate special rescue equipment which may be required. 
Aside from the aforementioned constraints, the unmodified EOS is applicable 
as a rescue vehicle to LEO situations while the Space Tug/TCM has application 
as either a BOW, BOR, o r  rescue vehicle across  the entire mission spectrum. 
The Space Shuttle (held in standby in LEO) has application to go to the geosyn- 
chronous and lunar orbit areas to render aid. It has the further capacity to be 
"paired with" (or deliver) a Space Tug/MCCM rescue vehicle combination for 
application to the GEOSS, Tug on LS, or LSB/OLS situations. 
As previously mentioned, the EOS and Space Tug (with 
Finally, the buddy system category is mentioned to reflect the conclusion that 
buddy system design should be considered for those transportation elements 
of the Integrated Program (EOS, Space Tug /TCM, Space Shuttle) where immed- 
iate manned assistance o r  immediate self-help facilities may be required for  
emergencies developing during the in-transit portions of their missions. 
7 .5  SUMMARY O F  RESULTS 
For  the equally high occurrence probability of emergencies assumed herein, 
a balanced mix of remedial systems is required to provide escape and rescue 
capability for the Integrated Program. This balanced system mix includes: 
a. New developments (XM, MTCM-I/PM) 
b. Modified Integrated Program elements (RBOW's based on modified 
TCM's, space rescue modules based on CCM's) 
Planned Integrated Program elements (EOS, Space Tug/TCM, 
Space Shuttle) 
c. 
i .. ... 
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If actual emergency event probabilities a r e  determined, they may permit the 
number of required remedial systems to be reduced. 
An expandable BOR or BOW device appears attractive for EOS Orbiter 
application due to its packaging flexibility. 
An SRV, manned o r  unmanned, seems desirable to meet the diverse emergency 
situation needs identified; the modified EOS Crew /Cargo Module (MCCM) appears 
attractive for this purpose. 
The Space Tug /TCM has many potential retrieval and /or BOR applications; 
the TCM itself has further application potential a s  a BOW device. 
As the EOS Orbiter is the primary mode for return to earth in all cases, the 
Orbiter should have the capability to return an MCCM or  its equivalent as a 
space rescue module. 
7. 6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In view of the sensitivity of remedial systems selection to emergency event 
probabilities, it is recommended that: 
a. The input data needed for a quantitative assessment of remedial 
systems be developed. 
occurrence probability determination but also the definition of an 
explicit mission model and improved cost estimates of associated 
hardware elements. 
Additional tradeoff studies be performed to further reduce the 
number of desired remedial systems. 
This would include not only emergency 
b. 
-122- 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
,1 
In the foregoing sections, many of the diverse requirements and needs attendant 
to potential Integrated Program escape and rescue missions were addressed. 
Each specific area of investigation was  shown to have unique equipment and/or 
operational requirements and varying degrees of impact on the overall pro- 
blem of space rescue. 
significant study conclusions presented in more detail throughout the report. 
This section provides a summary overview of the more 
8.1 HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
The space hazards pertinent to the Integrated Program a r e  much the same as  
for earlier programs and missions. 
resulting from the occurrence of space hazards were  identified. However, 
when the numerous missions and hardware elements of the Integrated Pro-  
gram a re  combined with these ten general emergency situation categories, 
the resulting potential emergency situation matrix is very large. 
Ten general emergency situations 
8.2 CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
An overall safety contingency plan is needed for the Integrated Program. 
This conclusion is based on a review of NASA and contractor documents for 
safety guidelines and contingency planning which indicates that: 
a. 
b. 
There is only a "de facto" safety plan, elements of which 
a re  scattered throughout many documents. 
There is little coordinated planning between interfacing program 
elements . 
c.  Equipment capabilities and safety operations were assumed 
without determining their technical feasibility. 
d. Availability, when needed, of specialized escape and 
rescue equipment is assumed. 
has not been initiated. 
There a r e  no escape or rescue provisions specified, as  yet, 
for either the Earth Orbit Shuttle o r  the manned Space Tug 
(nor for the Space Shuttle). 
Planning for i ts  acquisition 
e. 
- 123- 
8 . 3  
a. 
b. 
C.  
d. 
e. 
f .  
8.4 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Subsynchronous earth orbits (repeating ground tracks) 
offer a potential safety advantage in that communications 
and reentry functions a re  no longer random processes. 
Initial and projected Integrated Program communications and 
tracking facilities (MSFN, data relay satellites) offer continuous 
coverage. It is not clear whether these facilities will include 
the capability to skintrack mute vehicles. 
capabilities a r e  desirable from a safety viewpoint. 
CONUS-only landing sites can impose a reentry delay of 7 
or 8 orbits or 11-13 hours (based on ETR as launch site). 
Multiple CONUS sites offer little benefit over a single site. 
No single CONUS site offers a shorter reentry delay than 
ETR. 
Available information indicates that remedial action need be 
taken in from I to 5 days for non-catastrophic emergency 
situations, in order to prevent additional crew fatality among 
the surviving crew members. 
reaction time, the current EOS reaction time specification of 
24 hours appears unrealistic; launch reaction times can approach 
150 hours and ascent and rendezvous times can approach 26 
hours. 
emergency may take a day or more. 
rescue equipment may be required to provide an acceptable 
ground-based response. 
Midcourse abort and fast return to LEO with still-available 
onboard AV appear feasible for in-transit vehicles on geo- 
synchronous and lunar missions 
Space rescue vehicle AV needs can be very high. 
mission, the AV requirement is least (-22,000 fps) when the SRV 
i s  based in lunar orbit. For  the geosynchronous mission, the 
AV is least (14,000 fps and up) when the SRV is based in GEO. 
Both of these 
With regard to ground-based 
In addition, space rescue operations at the scene of the 
Dedicated or standby 
For the lunar 
SPACE RESCUE VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS 
Potential operations and equipment needs to perform a rescue mission a re  
extensive. 
equipment and operational capability for that reason alone. 
personnel and equipment transfer to and f rom the distressed vehicle must be 
provided. 
case where no docking is possible. 
in  parallel with the basic Integrated Program hardware element to which i t  is 
intended to interface. 
Hazards to the SRV itself may be present, requiring specific 
Techniques for 
This results in extensive special rescue equipment needs for  the 
Such support hardware should be developed 
... 
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8.5 REMEDIAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Integrated Program rescue vehicles (EOS, Space Tug) lack the capability to 
cope with all emergency situations. 
incorporating "special rescue equipment, 'I and generally have inadequate AV. 
Because the EOS and the Tug have limited capability, additional capability 
for rescue operations may be required. 
rate special SRV, a BOW device, or a BOR device. A mix of desired rescue 
and escape equipment was  identified which contains new devices, basic Inte- 
grated Program hardware, and modifications of basic hardware. These 
selections were based on the current mission and hardware element status; 
this number may be reduced when emergency event probabilities a re  
determined. 
They have only a limited capacity for 
This may be in the form of a sepa- 
-125- 

9. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In view of the foregoing conclusions, a number of specific recommendations 
a re  appropriate. 
9.1 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1.1 
In this general area, i t  is recommended that: 
Means for Enhancing Integrated Program Safety 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
9.1.2 
Mission definition and operational procedures be 
adjusted to provide for a standby Space Rescue' 
Vehicle (SRV) in a given theater of operation, and 
to provide for a standby Space Shuttle whenever such 
a vehicle is making a t r ip  to or from GEO or LO. 
Special emergency equipment (docking fixtures, 
airlocks, transfer capsules, kits, high-pressure EVA 
suit, etc. ) be considered to facilitate a rescue mission. 
Planned Integrated Program hardware elements (CCM, 
TCM) be adapted to perform special purpose remedial 
functions (BOW, BOR, rescue modules). 
The small (2 to 3-man) expandable BOR device be given 
consideration for LEO applications. 
Mission hardware be designed to permit ( i )  escape using 
bail-out devices and (2) docking under emergency 
conditions. 
EOS Studies 
It is recommended that continuing and future EOS studies give specific 
consideration to (1) the EOS as  a "distressed vehicle" and (2) a s  part  of 
a rescue system. 
9.1.3 Analytic Studies 
It is recommended that analyses be conducted to (1) determine emergency 
event probabilities and (2)  further study the techniques for increasing the 
rescue and escape utility of Integrated Program hardware elements. 
-127- 
9.2 SPE C I FIC RE C OMME ND A T IONS 
More specific detailed recommendations, in the same areas  as delineated 
above, a r e  summarized in Figures 38 through 40. 
9.3 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
In consonance with the foregoing, a plan for implementation is presented in 
Figures 41 and 42. 
Figure 41 lists those remedial system hardware developments appropriate as  
either special rescue equipment or specific remedial devices (BOR, BOW, 
SRV). Also shown a r e  projected ROM development costs, assuming parallel 
development of any device based on modification of an existing or planned 
Integrated Program element (RBOW, MTCM-I, MCCM). 
Figure 42 presents a schedule for implementing some of the hardware 
developments and analytical studies previously mentioned. It should be noted 
that the schedule, as shown, is keyed to the EOS operational date (assumed to 
be mid-CY 1979) and the LEOSS operational date (assumed to be late CY 1981). 
With regard to this schedule, the following observations a r e  pertinent. 
a .  
b. 
An advanced technology effort i s  required only for the 
expandable Bail- Out - and- Return- to- earth device. 
The minimum cost Bail-Out-and-Wait device (RBOW I) 
development would require the availability of the Space Tug 
Crew Module (TCM) in 1981. 
Space rescue module (MCCM) development requires availability 
of the EOS crew/ module (CCM) by 1981. 
Acquisition schedules for remedial systems intended for LO, 
LS, and GEO application were  not determinable due to lack of 
a firm mission plan. 
Hardware implementation decisions a re  required by mid- 1976 
to make the plan timely and effective. 
c . 
d. 
e. 
, 
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10. GLOSSARY O F  ACRONYMS 
AL 
AMU 
BOD 
BOR 
BOW 
CCM 
CM 
CONUS 
c w  
DV 
EC/ LS 
EO1 
EOS 
EOSS 
EPS 
ETR 
EVA 
FLSC 
GEO 
GEOSS 
HT 
HTI 
air  lock 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit 
Bail-out Device (BOW or  stranded BOR) 
Bail-out and Return device 
Bail- out and W a i t  device 
Crew / Car go Module 
Command Module ( Apollo) 
continental United States 
continuous wire (heat sensing devices) 
Distressed Vehicle 
Environmental Control and Life Support system 
e a r  th or  bit inje ction 
Earth Orbiting Shuttle vehicle 
Earth Orbiting Space Station 
electric power system 
Air Force Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB, Fla. 
extravehicular activity 
flexible linear shaped charge 
geosynchronous orbit 
Geosynchronous Orbit Space Station 
Hohmann Transfer (minimum energy transfer) 
Hohmann Transfer injection 
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I 4 
i 
IP 
IR 
IVA 
LEO 
LEO1 
LEOSS 
LO 
LO1 
LS 
LSB 
LWIR 
MAP 
MCCM 
MEM 
MMV 
MTCM 
NERVA 
OLS 
OPD 
PAL 
PAP 
PL 
PLSS 
PM 
Integrated Program (NASA Space operations proposed for  the 
post- 1980 period) 
infrared 
intr avehicular activity 
low earth orbit 
low earth orbit injection 
Low Earth Orbit Space Station 
lunar orbit 
lunar orbit injection 
lunar surface 
Lunar Surface Base 
Long-Wave Infrared Detection and Acquisition System 
Modified Apollo Command Module 
Modified Crew/Cargo Module of the EOS 
M a r s  Excursion Module 
Manned Mars Vehicle 
Modified Tug Crew Module (Space Tug) 
nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application 
Orbiting Lunar Station 
Orbiting Propellant Depot 
portable airlock 
Prepositioned Aid Package 
payload 
Portable Life Support System 
Propulsion Module 
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RBOR 
RBOW 
RCS 
RDF 
RF . 
RDT &E 
RM 
RMU 
ROM 
RS 
SB 
sc 
SERD 
SRCC 
SRV 
ss 
TCM 
TEI  
T LI 
TM 
URM 
uv 
AV 
WTR 
/ 
Rigid Bail-out and Return Device 
Rigid Bail- out and Wait device 
reaction control system 
radio direction finder 
radio frequency 
research, development, test ,  and evaluation 
Remedial Means 
Remotely Operated Manipulator Unit 
rough order of magnitude 
Remedial System 
Space Base 
Spacecraft 
Small Earth Reentry Device 
Space Rescue Control Center (on the ground o r  in orbit) 
Space Rescue Vehicle 
Space Station 
Crew Module associated with Space Tug 
trans-earth injection 
trans- lunar injection 
Transfer Module 
Unmanned Rescue Vehicle 
ultraviolet 
vehicle velocity increment required for a specific 
mission maneuver 
Air Force Western Test Range, Vandenberg AFB, Calif. 
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XBOW Expandable Bail-out-and- W a i t  device 
XM Expandable Reentry Module 
YAG yttrium aluminum garnet (radiation detection 
element material) 
- 142 - 

